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Cellular Phone or Cellphone—A portable telephone that uses wireless cellular
technology to send and receive phone signals. (dictionary.reference.com)
Cloud Computing-- Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction. (nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/)
Electronic Communication—means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce…(Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 18 USC 119).
Electronic Communications System—means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photo electronic facilities for the transmission of electronic
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for
the electronic storage of such communications. (Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 USC 119).
Email—the system for using computers to send messages over the internet.
(dictionary.cambridge.org)

x

GPS—Global Positioning System: a navigational system involving satellites and
computers that can determine the latitude and longitude of a receiver on Earth by
computing the time difference for signals from different satellites to reach the
receiver (wordnetweb.princeton.edu).
Internet—The internet is the single, interconnected, worldwide system of commercial,
governmental, educational, and other computer networks that share (a) the
protocol suite specified by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), and (b) the
name and address spaces manages by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN). (nist.gov/publications)
Internet Protocol (IP)—Standard protocol for transmission of data from source to
destinations in packet-switched communications networks and interconnected
systems of such networks. (nist.gov/publications)
Oral Communication—means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any
electronic communication (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18
USC 119).

xi

Wire Communication—means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use
of facilities for the transmission of communication by the aid of wire, cable, or
other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated
by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the
transmission of interstate or foreign communications for communications
affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic
storage of such communications. (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 18 USC 119).
Wireless Technology—Technology that permits the transfer of information between
separated points without physical connection. (nist.gov/publications)

xii

Greene, Frederick V., J.D., Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. The Path Toward
Clear and Convincing Digital Privacy Rights. Major Professor: Dr. Linda Naimi, J.D.,
Ed.D..
This study was a legal based inquiry to determine to what extend digital privacy rights
are adequately protected by existing law. Because the major statutory vehicle that guides
privacy rights in America was passed in 1986, the courts have had to address issues not
contemplated by the statute. This study reviews the rulings of all twelve United States
Courts of Appeal to determine whether or not digital privacy rights are expanded or
limited. Comparisons are made between various circuits and different regions of the
country. Three questions are addressed in this study, summarized as; a question about the
current status of digital privacy laws; a question about the impact of court decisions on
digital privacy rights; and a question and assessment about the adequacy of digital
privacy laws. Also, recommendations are suggested for how digital privacy rights can be
enhanced in the future. These recommendations would first change the standard needed
to issue warrants and to access an individuals’ digital privacy rights to a “clear and
convincing” analysis and standard. Secondly, the author recommends that digital privacy
rights should become analogous to intellectual property rights and should have the same
level of protection afforded intellectual property rights. Although digital privacy is not
yet firmly recognized as more akin to Intellectual Property deserving of heightened
protection, this study recommends that digital privacy, along with trade secret, copyright
and patents, and trademark law should all be considered a type of intellectual capital that
needs to be protected from those not authorized to access or utilize that intellectual
property.
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1.1 Statement of the Problem
The world has progressed to the point that, digital and electronic communications
have evolved exponentially since the passage of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986. In 1986, the internet was in its infancy. Although, email existed it was not
generally available or used by the public, and was the exclusive province of geeks and
nerds. Mobile technology barely existed and had extremely limited functionality, totally
unlike today where the average 12 -year old caries a Smartphone. Social Networking had
an entirely different meaning related to personal in-person relationships—clearly not the
internet phenomena known as social networking today, where individuals might stay in
close touch with someone else a continent or two away. “Cloud computing” was two
words not typically found in the same sentence. In the ensuing years since 1986, digital
communications have exploded. It is quite astounding to see the vast amounts of data and
information available online. Along with that tremendous expansion, we have seen the
rise of internet banking, ecommerce, and online shopping, accompanied by a rising wave
of internet crime and intrusions into personal privacy. Private citizens have become
increasingly concerned about their digital privacy. Incursions have intruded from
government entities to corporate entities and other members of the private sector.
Today, courts disagree on what the constitutional protections may be relative to
electronic communications and surveillance. United States Circuit Courts have split on
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the question as to what sort of protections exist from police intrusion into
communications as well as electronic surveillance of movement. Additionally, private
corporations and other entities have unprecedented access to information that at one time
was private. Historically, the courts have used a fourth amendment analysis to determine
what rights and privileges should be afforded to citizens regarding their digital privacy.
Many modern scenarios present questions implicating how fourth amendment protections
will be analyzed and implemented. The current statute appears to “miss the mark” when
it comes to protecting against the type of intrusions and violations of personal privacy
that exist with present technology.

1.2 Research Questions
The questions guiding this research are:
1.

What is the current status of digital privacy laws in the United States?

2.

How have judicial decisions affected the digital privacy rights of citizens
since 1986?

3.

Do current laws adequately protect the digital privacy rights of citizens?

1.3 Significance of the Problem
The world has changed significantly in the past twenty plus years. In that short
timeframe electronic communications have blossomed in a multitude of ways. Twenty
years ago, very few people knew of the existence of the internet, cell phones, email, GPS,
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Social Networking, or cloud computing. Today these terms and technologies are an
everyday part of most American’s lives. Twenty-five years ago, Congress passed the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. This statute has only been revised in a
few minor ways since its passage. The basic statute still exists as it did when enacted.
The courts have heard and decided numerous cases and decisions concerning the above
technologies without the benefit of new Congressional guidance as to how digital privacy
rights should be weighed, analyzed and protected. Many decisions from various courts
contradict decisions from other courts. Although the courts have used a Fourth
Amendment framework to analyze digital privacy rights, the question remains as to how
best those rights can be protected. The United States Supreme Court has weighed in on
only a few sparse cases, and there is significant controversy as to what rights are
protected versus which rights are not. This study attempts to create a roadmap to showing
the various conclusions that different courts have reached regarding the same
constitutional rights, and providing an analysis of the impact these decisions have on the
body of law affecting these new technologies.
This study was originally conceived to provide an accurate assessment of the
inconsistencies and contradictions present in the case made rule of law regarding the
impact of these new technologies on digital and electronic privacy rights. After a
thorough assessment on the present state of affairs it became clear that while the original
questions needed to be addressed, the ultimate direction of the dissertation needed to
change. A pattern emerged that clearly shows the relevant choices various courts have
made in applying constitutional principles to electronic and digital issues before the
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courts. The pattern that emerged showed that in the thirty (30) years since passage if the
ECPA, the world had changed drastically.
Digital and electronic communications have become the paramount and
ubiquitous manner of communication worldwide. The importance and significance of
digital communications presents an entirely new challenge that could not have been
envisioned in past eras – the issue of digital privacy rights. The need for serious digital
privacy rights protection far outstripped the need in years past. Simultaneously, society
recognized that terrorism presented a real threat to the peace and security Americans
want and enjoy. After the dreadful events on September 11, 2001, Congress immediately
passed the Patriot Act that increased law enforcement’s ability to snoop, spy, and track
any person’s electronic and digital communications. In the aftermath of that massive
expansion of surveillance rights, US citizens have been left with a weakened or nonexistent level of protection in digital and electronic communication.
This study, recognizing the tenor of the times, evolved to present a theoretical
analysis and frank assessment of the current state of affairs and future needs. To that
extent, this research is transformative in its outlook, assessment, and prognosis. The
changes recommended represent a complete paradigm shift in how the issue should be
handled.

1.4 Statement of the Purpose
One general purpose of this research was to analyze the current status of digital
and electronic privacy protection laws. The analysis was intended to gauge the status of
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protection afforded digital and electronic communications today with the protective
levels of digital, electronic and non-electronic communications in bygone decades.
Although the protection levels may be the same, and courts may be enforcing modernday electronic and digital communications privacy rights in a similar manner as
communications in the past, the answer to the research question may still be –no, the
United States does not adequately protect electronic and digital privacy rights with
present laws and judicial rulings.
If various types of communication common today, in the expanded electronic
world, do not enjoy the same level of protection that communications, electronic and
non-electronic, had in the past, then the answer still indicates that the law has lagged
behind the advancements in communications technology leaving electronic
communication rights and associated data security rights vulnerable and unprotected. To
answer the question in the affirmative, that is that digital and electronic privacy rights are
adequately protected under the law would require an affirmative showing that nothing
new has developed or happened since 1986 that requires that digital privacy deserves
greater protection then in the past.
This research, although not initially designed to do anything other than to explore
the research questions at hand, evolved into a recommendation for a complete paradigm
shift in the area of digital and electronic privacy rights. After assessing the current status
of digital communication and the relative importance of the privacy needs in this greatly
enhanced area of communication, the facts cried out for a robust solution. This research
presents a number of paradigmatic shifts in how we view electronic and digital
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communications and the value we should place on the process for protecting that
communications and the digital privacy rights associated with our communication.

1.5 Assumptions
The following assumptions were inherent to the pursuit of this study:
1. This study assumes that articulable factors exist in all cases evaluated that
will allow the researcher to show the various results courts have reached in
their judicial decisions.
2. Individual and collective rights of privacy can be articulated in a manner
that fairly represents the right sought to be protected in court proceedings.
3. Courts make decisions based on a reasonably finite set of factors or
variables that can be accurately determined in a discreet manner.
4. An evaluation can meaningfully express the results of the court holdings
and court decisions.
5. The results of an evaluation study can and should provide relevant and
appropriate information that allows reasonable inferences to be made
relative to a theoretical framework explaining these decisions.

1.6 Limitations
The following limitations were inherent to the pursuit of this study:
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1. The study was limited to relevant federal cases that cite the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in its entirety and makes no
assumptions about state cases or decisions, nor citations to laws or statutes
that are subsets of the ECPA.
2. The study was limited to that portion of cases that involve or implicate
“digital privacy rights,” or “electronic privacy rights” as those terms are
understood, and that cases that cite the act but fail to implicate digital
privacy rights in any way will be eliminated from the study as irrelevant.
3. The study was limited to actual cases filed and does not address disputes
involving the right of privacy that may have been settled out of court prior
to filing.

1.7 Delimitations
The following delimitations were inherent to the pursuit of this study:
1. This study does not purport to answer every question or to analyze every factor
relative to the privacy decisions.
2. This study only analyzes the factors articulated in the study.
3. Published opinions of the United States Court of Appeals were the only cases
considered.
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1.8 Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the problem, purpose, and significance of
the research. It presented research questions and discussed the underlying assumptions,
limitations, and delimitations of the study.
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2.1 The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (US Constitution, Fourth
Amendment).
The purview of what it means to be “secure” has been the subject of numerous
court cases. Almost every word in the Fourth Amendment has been the subject of some
form of litigation over the past 200 years. One of those words that have been litigated is
the word “warrant.” It is important to understand what the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect. According to Taylor, 2001, the “chief evil that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to address was the issuance of warrants that were
inappropriately general in nature. To that end, the proscription of ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures’ was a reference to illegally general warrants, and not an independent
standard governing searches and seizures” (Taylor, 2001, p.9).
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The US Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue as to the sufficiency of a
warrant authorizing law enforcement to seize items from a person’s home. In Stanford v.
Texas, The US Supreme Court (1965) stated:
We need not decide in the present case whether the description of the things to be
seized would have been too generalized to pass constitutional muster, had the
things been weapons, narcotics, or cases of whiskey. . . . The point is that it was
not any contraband of that kind which was ordered to be seized, but literary
material – “books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of
Texas, and the operations of the Communist Party in Texas.” The indiscriminate
sweep of that language is constitutionally intolerable. To hold otherwise would be
false to the terms of the Fourth Amendment, false to its meaning, and false to its
history (Taylor, 2001, p. 10, quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 US 476).
The Supreme Court went on in later cases to find that “reasonable expectations of
privacy” provides the standard whereby it can be judged whether or not a person can be
free from a warrantless search. The court discusses this idea in the case of Smith v.
Maryland in which the court indicates that:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz's two-pronged inquiry would
provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not
in fact entertain any actual expectation or privacy regarding their homes, papers,
and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this
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Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring
his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the
contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an
individual's subjective expectations had been “conditioned” by influences alien to
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations
obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper (Smith v.
Maryland, 442 US 735 [1979] as quoted by Taylor, 2001, p. 12).

2.2 A Right to Privacy
The US Supreme Court very early on recognized that for the right to be “secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects” to be effective, there naturally must occur a
right to “privacy.” Although the word privacy cannot be found in the United States
Constitution, its presence can be found in numerous cases. The Supreme Court has
indicated that the Right to Privacy is within the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights
(Oyama, 2006). Privacy has been defined in many ways, but it generally is “the right to
be left alone.” It is considered an individual, personal right (Lasprogata, King, & Pillay,
2004).
The right to privacy in many ways is like personal property that can be traded
away or bargained away. In the absence of willingly trading or bargaining away the right,
it is considered an enforceable right against others that would violate that right
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(Lasprogata, King, & Pillay, 2004). The first cases that dealt with this right of privacy
were not in an electronic context but in cases involving the United States mail. These
cases, long before federal law was passed regarding electronic communication, addressed
privacy rights in mail delivered by the US Post Office. The concept of privacy as it
relates to mail was first promulgated in a US Supreme Court case called Ex Parte Jackson
as early as 1877 (Pikowsky, 2003). Ex Parte Jackson (96 US at 727) held that:
[A] distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter, between
what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed
packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to inspection, such as
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a
condition to be examined. Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are
as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form
and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles.
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be
opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are
subjected to search in one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the
hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the
secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations
adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great
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principle embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Pikowsky,
2003, p. 7; quoting Ex Parte Jackson, (1877).
Later cases dealing with postal mail generally have held that there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the mail that requires a warrant for a package or letter to be
opened by law enforcement. In the case of United States v. Van Leeuwen, the United
States Supreme Court upheld statutory provisions Congress passed that codified
protection of the United States Mail from warrantless searches (Pikowsky, 2003).

2.3 Electronic Surveillance
The first case that ever dealt with the issue of electronic surveillance was decided
by the US Supreme Court in 1928 in the case of Olmstead v. United States (Horn, 2002).
This case was decided almost 50 years after the telephone was invented by Alexander
Graham Bell. Unfortunately, the case held that warrantless wiretaps of telephones were
not a violation Fourth Amendment rights (Horn, 2002). This interpretation ultimately led
to an act of Congress to curtail the warrantless wiretapping of telephones.
The Communications Act of 1934 said that “no person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purpose, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person” (Horn, 2002). Federal agencies routinely got around this congressionally
mandated prohibition by claiming that the statute required two acts to become applicable;
namely interception and divulgence. Federal agencies made it a point to indicate that they
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were only intercepting not divulging the information, so the act should not apply to their
activities.
Ironically, Justice Brandeis dissented in the Olmstead case and provided what is
considered to be one of the most visionary quotes from the bench nearly 70 years ahead
of its time. Brandeis’ dissent said;
Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.... Can it be
that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security” (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 1928, p. 474)
The practice of ignoring a warrant requirement continued until 1937 when the
Supreme Court indicated that the Wiretap Act prevented federal agencies from
warrantless wiretaps even without their divulgence of the information (Horn, 2002).
Two more US Supreme Court decisions in the next decade played a major role in
defining the rights that individuals had in electronic telecommunications. Berger v. New
York, and Katz v. United States. The Berger decision struck down a New York statute
that authorized governmental warrantless wiretapping. The court noted that conversations
are protected under the US Constitution, and that seizure of these conversations amounts
to a search (Horn, 2002).
The Katz decision affirmatively held that law enforcement had to obtain a search
warrant based upon the usual probable cause standard to monitor telephone calls placed
from a telephone booth (Oyama, 2006). These decisions were tempered by a later
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decision in United States v. Miller that held that these privacy rights did not exist where
the contents of a private communication is revealed to third parties (Oyama, 2006).

2. 4 The Wiretap Act and the Super Warrant
Much of what the Supreme Court decided in Berger and Katz was ultimately
codified into law with the 1968 passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act. Certain provisions of this legislation are commonly referred to as the
Wiretap Act (Mulligan, 2004). The various provisions of this act are succinctly
summarized by Mulligan, 2004:
First, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title
III”), creating a statutory right of privacy in oral and wire communications,
predated the advent of electronic communications. Written in 1968, the statute
was directed at the “aural acquisition” of voice communications that passed, at
least in part, over a wire. The wiretap provisions of Title III authorized law
enforcement wiretapping of telephones within a framework designed to protect
privacy and compensate for the uniquely intrusive aspects of electronic
surveillance. Title III requires law enforcement to obtain what has been referred
to as a “superwarrant” before intercepting phone conversations. While
instinctually individuals using e-mail may have expected protections against
interception to extend to this new means of communicating, courts had found that
a literal reading of the statute did not provide protection. Electronic mail and data
are not “oral” communications, nor are they subject to “aural” acquisition. Any
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prohibition on intercepting electronic communications would thus have to be
based on the Fourth Amendment itself (Mulligan, 2004, p. 1561).
Notwithstanding the prohibition of warrantless searches by law enforcement, J.
Edgar Hoover routinely ordered federal agents of the FBI to conduct these warrantless
searches throughout his tenure at the FBI from 1924-1972 (Horn, 2002).
Later as more and more people became involved with electronic communication,
the need for additional statutory protection was apparent to Congress. In 1986 Congress
adopted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Although adopted at a time
when electronic communications was growing, this act still preceded the explosive
growth of the internet. As McDonough (2007) points out, “The words ‘Internet’, ‘World
Wide Web,’ and ‘e-commerce’ appear in neither the ECPA nor its legislative history.” In
effect the ECPA amends the wiretap act and makes many of the earlier provisions
applicable to electronic communications. The ECPA is divided into three different areas
as explained by Mulligan, 2004:
[T]he Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2522; the Pen Register statute, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-3127; and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012711. The Wiretap Act and Pen Register statute regulate prospective surveillance
of Internet communications (communications “in transit”), and the SCA governs
retrospective surveillance (stored communications). Each of the titles operate in
the same basic way generally prohibiting unauthorized access to communications
and other personal information, but permitting specified exemptions, one of which
provides the government with the ability to obtain direct access or to compel a
third party to turn over information (Mulligan, 2004, p. 1565).
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2.5 In the Case of Email
Each of the provisions of the Wiretap Act, The Pen Register statute, and The
Stored Communications Act (SCA) have different provisions for enforcement and
interpretation. This has allowed for different levels of protection for electronic
communications depending on where it is in the transmission chain. Emails, for example,
are subject to different regulations depending on whether or not they have been sent,
opened, unopened, viewed and/or stored (Albrecht,2003). It is important to note that
analogies about email are not based on express mention of the term “email” in the ECPA.
In 1986 when the ECPA was adopted, email was in its infancy and not considered
something in need of statutory protection in and of itself. Dombrow (1998) cites a 1995
Dunn and Bradstreet study that shows:
While e-mail in the workplace continues to grow, its use by businesses is not a
new phenomenon. In a 1995 survey of 272 small to mid-size businesses, fifty-six
percent reported use of e-mail within the company, forty-one percent exchanged
e-mail with off site employees, twenty-three percent exchanged e-mail with
suppliers, and eighteen percent exchanged e-mail with business advisors. These
companies also reported thirty-eight percent as having regularly telecommuting
employees. Already in 1995, eighty-seven percent of the Fortune 100 companies
reported using e-mail for person to person messaging (Dombrow, 1998, p.695).

This 1995 study was conducted some nine years after the 1986 act (ECPA) was
passed. At that time the vast majority of email usage was intra-company with only 23%
of companies in the survey exchanging email with non-company entities. In 1986, email
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was not on the radar screen of Congress. The word email is not even mentioned in the
ECPA (Dombrow, 1998). Other technologies in use today had not for the most part been
invented or discovered as the case may be. Peer to Peer communications, Cloud
Computing, social networks, The World Wide Web, and most of what has become
common in everyday usage did not exist at the time of the ECPA’s adoption. The ECPA
does provide three different methods for obtaining communication under the act. These
three methods are; 1. The warrant, 2. The Administrative Subpoena, and 3. The National
Security Letter (NSL). The use of NSL’s grew tremendously after 9/11 and the enactment
of the USA Patriot Act (McNerney, 2010).
Although the ECPA fails in many ways to protect the newer technologies, some
courts have forged ahead with judicial protection. The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Ohio decided a case that generally upheld the idea of privacy protection for
email:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that
when a user does not expect a third party to access one's e-mail in the normal
course of business, “the party maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
subpoenaing the entity with mere custody over the documents is insufficient to
trump the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” On remand, the Court
permitted the government to seize private e-mails in electronic storage under the
following circumstances: (1) by obtaining a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment; (2) by providing notice to the account holder when seeking a court
order; or (3) by showing specific, articulable facts, demonstrating that the ISP or
other entity has complete access to the e-mails in the normal course of its
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business, which demonstrates that the user has waived any expectation of privacy
(Wright, 2007-2008, pp.548-549, citing Warshak v US).

2.6 The Push for Reform
Various courts have issued opinions all over the board when it comes to the
privacy protections afforded electronic communications. The uncertainty has led many
groups to advocate for reform of the law by Congress. One such group advocating reform
is called Digital Due Process (DDP). DDP is a “broad coalition of technology and
communications companies, trade associations, advocacy groups, and think tanks, as well
as academics and individual lawyers” (Comments of Digital Due Process, 2010). The
coalition generally advocates that the warrant requirement apply for electronic searches.
The DDP has six guiding principles: “Technology and Platform Neutrality…Assurance
of Law Enforcement Access…Equality Between Transit and
Storage…Consistency…Simplicity and Clarity…Recognition of All Existing
Exceptions” (Comments of Digital Due Process, 2010).

2.7 In the Case of the iPhone
Apple has fought a number of cases relative to the desire of the federal
government to force it to create a backdoor to the Apple iPhone. Although there have
been past cases where Apple has cooperated with the government, there appears to be a
number of recent cases where Apple has drawn the line in the sand (Los Angeles Times.
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Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-me-apple-police20160226-story.html).
One case in 2016, deals with the San Bernardino terrorist gunmen. These
terrorists owned an Apple iPhone 5C. The Apple iPhone 5C has an encryption program
that if a wrong password is entered into the phone ten successive times, all of the data on
the phone will be destroyed. The FBI had attempted to break the password on nine
occasions unsuccessfully (Retrieved from https://www.nbc.news.com/storyline/sanbernardino-shooting/Apple-FBI-face-Congressional-hearing-encryption-N528841). They
were concerned that if they tried one more time, all of the data they were trying to
retrieve would be destroyed (The Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/17/apple-ceo-the-u-sgovernment-wants-something-we-consider-too-dangerous-tocreate/?utm_term=.1f213d33c2bd).
The FBI obtained a search warrant and court order against Apple to force Apple
Computer to write a program that would disable the ten wrong password security feature.
Apple continually refused. Apple indicated that to create such a program would
compromise the security of all Apple iPhones. Their argument was that once this program
existed, not only would there be no limit as to when it would be used, but also, other
hackers and those who do not have a purported right to the information would be in a
better position to disable the same feature that Apple had designed into the iPhone. The
legal issues before the judge were actually quite complex. Not only are privacy and other
constitutional issues involved, but statutory interpretation was also involved. Most
amazingly, the FBI was relying on The “All Writs Act of 1789.” This 200+ year old act
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was all the government could find to make a clear case. Apple CEO, Tim Cook, has
indicated that the United States government “wants something we considered too
dangerous to create.” Apple CEO, Tim Cook goes on to indicate “we have great respect
for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe their intentions are good.” Up to this
point, we have done everything that is both within our power and within the law to help
them. But now the US government has asked us for something we simply do not have
and something we considered too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a
backdoor to the iPhone.”
In the past decade, it has become clear that privacy rights would become and have
become one of the major concerns that most individuals should have regarding protecting
their valuable personal information. A number of cases that have garnered publicity tells
us how important privacy rights are to everyday Americans.

2.8 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
Congress could not have conceived in 1986 when it passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) that was designed to regulate access by the
government to electronic communications and records that the world of electronic
communications would have grown to the dimensions that it has grown to today. The
very assumptions that existed in 1986 are no longer applicable. The Internet was barely
operational in 1986. Now a substantial part of commerce worldwide is conducted through
the Internet.
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Additionally, the idea of social media had not even been born yet. Social media
now accounts for a huge percentage of traffic on the Internet. Congress could not have
even understood that the world itself would shrink, metaphorically, when the ability to
post something in the Middle East that could be instantly read in China that could be
instantly commented on in North America. The idea that communications would be
worldwide and instantaneous was more of a science fiction idea, than the reality that it
has become. Some of the major flaws that Congress could not have foreseen came about,
partly, because of the dramatic reduction in the cost of electronic storage.
Many of you like me, may remember when storage was extremely expensive. My
first computer in 1984 was a Kaypro II. Because of the prohibitive cost of storage and
hard drives, my first computer did not even have a hard drive. The way you saved
information was from 5 ¼ floppy disks to 5 ¼ floppy disks. Kaypro had two floppy disk
drives specifically so that you could save information from one to the other. I recall my
first IBM PC with an MS-DOS operating system which I purchased sometime in 1987.
This first “Windows-based system” had a 40 MB hard drive. I now carry in my pocket a
smart phone with a 64 GB storage capacity (1600 times more storage capability). A law
that was written in 1986 when storage was at a premium, necessarily focused on real-time
surveillance. The law heavily prohibits access to real-time data but is quite weak in
enforcing access for stored records. The idea of stored records doesn’t even make sense
today. Not only do we store things on our individual devices, but we have access to
unlimited storage in the cloud. The idea that there should be a distinction, between the
government or any other entity, having access to real-time information versus stored
information is now nonsensical. Yet the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act is
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heavily based on that distinction. Any new law, or any new protection has to recognize
that privacy rights are not contingent upon the storage medium, but that privacy rights
should be protected at a high level that would assure an absolute level of confidence that
other entities or individuals that had no right to the information would not be able to
access that information.

2.9 Digital Due Process Coalition
Some of the major proposals that exist today for fixing the problem related to lack
of privacy protections in electronic communications, are promulgated by what is known
as the Digital Due Process Coalition. This coalition, including many companies that are
household names. Apple Computer, Facebook, Alphabet Inc. (the owner of Google),
Amazon, Adobe, AOL, eBay, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, as well as the American Civil
Liberties Union, to name a few, are all a part of this coalition. This Digital Due Process
Coalition (digitaldueprocess.org) has as a motto, “modernizing surveillance laws for the
Internet age.” If you go to their website you can see that they have a comprehensive and
extensive approach to updating privacy laws in the United States. They list as their
guiding principle:
To simplify, clarify, and unify the ECPA standards, providing stronger privacy
protections for communications and associated data in response to changes in
technology and new services and usage patterns, while preserving the legal tools
necessary for government agencies to enforce the laws, respond to emergency
circumstances and protect the public (Retrieved from
https://digitaldueprocess.org)
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The Digital Due Process Coalition promotes four major principles. They are as
follows;

1. The government should obtain a search warrant based on probable cause
before it can compel a service provider to disclose a user’s private
communications or documents stored online.
2. The government should obtain a search warrant based on probable cause
before it can track, prospectively or retrospectively, the location of a cell
phone or other mobile communications device.
3. Before obtaining transactional data in real time about when and with whom an
individual communicates using email, instant messaging, text messaging, the
telephone or any other communications technology, the government should
demonstrate to a court that such data is relevant to an authorized criminal
investigation.
4. Before obtaining transactional data about multiple unidentified users of
communications or other online services when trying to track down a suspect,
the government should first demonstrate to a court that the data is needed for
its criminal investigation. (Retrieved from
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF8E02000C296BA163).

While these four major principles are certainly a step forward from the antiquated
and nonexistent coverage now afforded by the ECPA, it really only involves tinkering at
the edges. The idea that our electronic privacy should be held hostage to mere notions of
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“Probable Cause” that judges can ascertain based upon the flimsiest of evidence, really
does not provide adequate protection of Americans privacy rights. To properly analyze
this idea, we must go back to the United States Constitution and try to understand what
exactly the fourth amendment was designed to protect. When the Bill of Rights was
passed by Congress in 1794 and ratified in 1795, the ideas embodied in the fourth
amendment had a particular meaning. The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. …… (https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment).

The Fourth Amendment was adopted to protect Americans from physical
violations and physical incursions. The founding fathers obviously had no reason to think
in terms of protection of electronic or digital privacy rights. Physical incursions are by
nature, limited in scope and breadth. Limitations on manpower alone conceivably would
limit the scope of a search or seizure. Certainly a massive army could execute a large
scale search or seizure, but this necessitates tremendous resources and effort. Electronic
communications, on the other hand, can be accessed with digital equipment that allows
for the massive accumulation of all sorts of data and information, including sensitive
digital privacy information.

26

2.10 The Case of Edward Snowden

Edward Snowden was a former Central intelligence agency employee and a
former US government subcontractor who copied and intentionally leaked classified
government information from the national security agency in 2013. After leaking this
information, Edward Snowden was forced to flee the United States and to seek asylum in
other countries. Ultimately, he ended up in Russia. Edward Snowden received help from
a number of whistleblower organizations including the Government Accountability
Project (GAP). GAP is a nonprofit organization that supports whistleblower activity, and
is a nonprofit organization that has been around since 1977 (Retrieved from
https://info.whistleblower.org).

A number of organizations including the Washington Post, and the Guardian
published many of the disclosures that were leaked by Snowden. (The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden; BBC News, Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22837100). In June 2013 the United States
Department of Justice brought charges against Snowden. These charges include theft of
US government or foreign government property; and violation of the espionage act of
1917,
The author takes no position as to the propriety or impropriety of Snowden’s
actions. What is important for purposes of this dissertation is that we now know with
certainty that the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as many other government
agencies, are involved in a massive collection of private data, from not only citizens, and
businesses, but also from various governments. We learned from the Edward Snowden
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disclosures that this amassing of information is unbelievably large in breadth and depth.
The question that arises, is to what extent should private data be protected from
government surveillance? Should the government be able to amass any amount of
information and intercept any communications that they wish to amass from US citizens
and others?
The Edward Snowden case demonstrates that no one is outside of the reach of
government data collection activities. The question before us today—is should the
government be able to collect this massive information unencumbered? The vast majority
of the information collected by the NSA is not collected pursuant to any sort of specific
warrant for information. There appears to be an ongoing program of data collection not in
any way tied to the need to obtain probable cause warrants. This massive collection of
data is a clear violation of the privacy rights of millions of Americans. Many would argue
that the government has to be able to collect this data to keep us safe. This is a false
argument. Terrorism exists in totalitarian countries as well as free societies. Americans
should not have to give up their privacy rights to remain safe.

2.11 Summary
This chapter explored the evolution of case law and legislation dealing with
protection of personal information and rights to privacy in the digital age. Prior to the
1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) there were numerous laws that
protected some of the earlier communications devices like telephones, telegraph, and
facsimile. The court always utilized the standard used in the Fourth Amendment to the
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US Constitution of “Probable Cause” to determine the parameters of privacy rights and
their protection from government intrusion. The world has changed rapidly since 1986.
Because we now live in a digital environment, the idea of privacy has grown
exponentially in significance. The 12-year old child at school needs protection from those
that may attempt to do her harm by befriending her online first. The Snowden case, and
data breaches at numerous retail establishments have made it transparently clear that
many citizens, businesses and even the government needs robust protection of privacy
rights.
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This analytical study investigated the question as to whether or not the United
States’ laws adequately protect digital and electronic communications privacy rights.
This inquiry is by nature a legal inquiry. Legal inquiries are quite different than most
types of inquiries in technology, science and/or the social sciences. Legal inquiries have
typically focused on case results from the courts in a sequential manner, when the
researcher is evaluating cases that may have established precedent on a particular topic.
Each case is dissected based on the particular fact pattern, and an analysis is conducted as
to how the court ruled and why. Legal researchers have also used various other research
methods including the analysis of statutes, laws and ordinances. This study by nature is a
qualitative study that attempts to shed light and information on the laws as they exist,
namely the ECPA, and what has been done to adapt or change, limit or expand the impact
of these laws to address the factually specific contingencies that could not have been
foreseen at the time of passage.

3.1 Legal Inquiries
There are a number of methodologies for conceptualizing how legal research is
presented. One of the most famous methodologies for analyzing a court opinion is called
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“IRAC.” IRAC is an acronym for “Issue, Rule, Analysis, and Conclusion.” This approach
calls for each case to be analyzed separately, and for the conclusions to be compared with
other cases. By reviewing cases on a case-by-case basis, clear descriptions emerge as to
what each particular case may attempt to accomplish within the context of the fact pattern
presented by the parties.
This type of research is clearly qualitative in nature. The present study utilized a
qualitative framework but with a slightly different focus than most types of legal
research. The method envisioned has been termed “Evaluation Studies” (Leeuw, 2011).
Evaluation studies are a type of qualitative study that attempts to take a broader view of
the cases that have been decided. It attempts to succeed at “applying different theories,
methodologies, and (research) designs” (Leeuw, 2011). The general goal is to evaluate
the criteria, rules and factors that played a role in the court decision. Many courts reach
their decision based upon factors that are clearly identifiable and quite similar to factors
present in many other cases. Would a broad view of these cases help to shed light on
general factors that are constant in their effect on the outcome?

3.2 Research Design
The specific method used in this study was to evaluate the relevant number or
portion of the Federal cases that cite the “Electronic Communications Privacy Act”
(ECPA) since the act’s passage in 1986. Although only two of these decisions are United
States Supreme Court decisions, the remainder are reported by various Courts of Appeals.
A total of 199 cases have been adjudicated by the fourteen United States Courts of
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Appeal. Although the focus is on the ECPA and how those decisions that were made
pursuant to the ECPA affected the outcome of the case, other factors were also explored.
Additionally, the ideas that digital privacy must always remain limited by the prevailing
legal theories are challenged. Many other legal theories have been advanced to protect
privacy rights. Some theories generally allude to intellectual property theories, while
other theories look at privacy as a “Public Good.” Relevant theories are evaluated and
analyzed.
A number of questions can be answered by such a study. To what extent has a
prevailing legal ideology developed that is largely fact dependent? The study will be a
cross between a “qualitative analysis,” and a “grounded theory study.” That is to say that
the study will take a broad perspective of important relevant decisions relating to the
ECPA and privacy in general and not over-analyze the ruling or conclusion reached by
the court. This study attempted to answer some broad questions related to the first general
research question: “Does the United States adequately protect Digital Privacy Rights?”
The remaining two questions presented are also analyzed.

3.3 Process and Procedures
This study was conducted utilizing relevant cases and statutes. The legal research
service “Westlaw” (https://www.westlaw.com) was used to find cases that matched the
subject matter of cases dealing with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
Two cases were from the United States Supreme Court. These two cases are dealt with
separately and not included in Chart 4.1. Cases were limited to the cases at the federal
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appellate level to assure that these cases were not mere anomalies or “one offs,” but truly
represented common law precedent in the federal courts with stare decisis impact.
Westlaw is one of two major commercial legal research platforms in the United States.
The other legal research source is LexisNexis (https://www.lexisnexis.com). Westlaw
gives the researcher the assurance that every published case in any court in the United
States can be searched and found. After a number of efforts to isolate the relevant cases
for analysis, it was determined that two search terms provided the level of reliability
needed in identifying the cases.
The relevant search terms involved finding cases that used the four letter acronym
“ECPA” as well as expanding that search to cases where the parties and the court never
used the acronym but always referred to the statute by its formal name of the “Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.” A Boolian search term was constructed to search the
entire database of United States Courts of Appeal cases. The Boolian search term that
worked the best was; electronic /s communication /s privacy /s act. This search term
identified every case that had those four terms in a single sentence or line. After
identifying the 199 cases from the various US Courts of Appeal, the cases were studied to
determine what impact, if any, the case would have on ECPA precedent and digital
privacy. Three categories were created to compile results into a meaningful and cohesive
matrix for further analysis. The three categories are:
Expands Digital Privacy Rights
Limits Digital Privacy Rights
Does Not Impact on Digital Privacy rights
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Because the study was focused on whether or not judicial decisions have helped
to either expand or limit electronic or digital privacy rights, those cases constituted the
major focus. Cases that were analyzed to have “Expand[ed] Digital Privacy Rights”
became the cases to evaluate where and how the courts had interpreted the ECPA in a
manner to further digital privacy rights. The converse is true with cases that limited
digital privacy rights. In addition to the question regarding the present state of the ECPA,
this research endeavored to study the history and efficacy of intellectual property rights
as they may either impact or inform privacy rights. In reviewing the cases and laws,
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of the judges were considered. If the cases
dealt with either the violation of digital privacy rights or intellectual property regarding
patents and copyrights, they were considered and analyzed.
The cases were also analyzed that dealt with privacy rights that were protected to
see if particular rulings involved either violations of privacy rights, or possibly legislation
to correct or change those privacy rights issues that arose. Since 1986, no comprehensive
legislation has been adopted to deal with privacy rights in the digital age. The results of
what was determined from studying the 199 cases follows in a later section. It is fair to
state now that there is a patchwork quilt of laws that have failed to protect private citizens
and their rapidly emerging digital rights
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3.4 Summary

This chapter discussed methodology used in this study. This research was
conducted as a legal inquiry into past and present laws dealing with privacy rights in the
digital, electronic, and communications arenas. Cases involving violations of privacy
rights were examined and the efforts were made to identify patterns in the judgments of
judges as case law around digital privacy rights evolved.
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4.1 Analysis of Case Law
The data in this study represented a legal inquiry into legal cases that had a direct
bearing on the issue of privacy rights, as protected and expanded in the 1986 Electronic
Communications Privacy Act. Each of the 199 cases were qualitatively evaluated to
determine what rights were involved and how these rights were affected. In many cases it
was quite clear that the person or persons asserting privacy rights prevailed. These cases
were all grouped together in the category of “Expands Digital Privacy Rights.” In other
cases, the person or persons that asserted privacy rights were defeated or limited in the
result the court implemented. These cases were all identified with the designator of
“Limits Digital Privacy Rights.” Some cases involved rulings that ultimately were
decided on other grounds or were decided in such a way as to not affect any digital
privacy rights. Although the subject matters were different in the varied cases, they were
all able to be reduced to one of the three categories above. Because of the qualitative
nature of this study, no quantitative analyses of the data were indicated.
Although the study focused on cases citing the ECPA, it is important to note hat
the earliest instance of where privacy rights were discussed was in 1890 in the Harvard
Law Review (Harvard Law Review, 4, 5, 1890). Since then, the U.S. courts have
recognized the right to privacy, in various forms. This study, of course, focuses on digital
privacy rights and how laws, particularly the ECPA has affected digital privacy rights.
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4.2 Relevant Legislation

The advent of the microcomputer and the rapid growth of the internet swamped
any effort to properly regulate this technology. The failure of Congress and state
legislatures to properly keep up with this rapid growth resulted in the courts’, by
necessity, addressing these issues. The courts, restrained by precedent and stare decisis,
have been unable to keep up with this massive growth in technology, particularly in a
systematic and comprehensive manner. This has resulted in incongruity, depending on
which jurisdiction you may reside in, or which federal circuit where you may reside.

4.3 A Comparison of Relevant Cases

After evaluating the 199 cases, a chart was developed to easily ascertain the effect
each case has on digital privacy rights. An examination of the cases revealed 31 of the
199 demonstrating some expansion of digital privacy rights. 73 cases showed little or no
impact on digital privacy rights. But the majority of the cases, 95 to be specific, revealed
limitations and curtailments of digital privacy rights. The factors that were considered to
determine whether or not a case was classified as (E) Expansion of Digital Privacy
Rights, (L) Limitation of Digital Privacy Rights, or (D) Does not impact Digital Privacy
Rights are as follows:

a. Did the party that was asserting a digital privacy right prevail in protecting
that right or was that right not protected?
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b. Did the party that was opposed to the asserted digital privacy right
successfully achieve their goals in contravention of the asserted digital privacy
right.
c. Did the court decide the case on grounds that were unrelated to the asserted
digital privacy right?
d. Did the case involve factors that did not involve a digital privacy right, but
was related to some of the criminal provisions of the ECPA, resulting in no
impact on any ascertainable digital privacy rights?
e. Does the case represent a situation that general privacy rights are implicated
and affected, although the impact in the instant case may be tenuous?
f. Considering all of the factors in a-e above, can it fairly be said that by a
preponderance of evidence the privacy rights were either expanded, limited, or
not affected?

Table 4.3 presents the 199 cases according to whether the judicial decision
limited, expanded or had no impact on digital privacy rights. The table lists each case,
identifying the year and the court from which the decision was rendered and the citation
where it can be found, along with the level of impact on digital privacy rights.
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Table 4.3
United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial ECPA Decisions

Case Name

Year

Citation

Appeals
Court

Result

In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy
Litigation
United States v. Graham
U.S. v. Scurry

2016

---F.3d----

Third Circuit

2016
2016

--- F.3d ---821 F.3d 1

Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC
Vista Marketing, LLC v.
Burkett
Jewel v. National Sec.
Agency
Tech Systems, Inc. v. Pyles

2016

817 F.3d 12

Fourth Circuit L
District of
L
Columbia
Circuit.
First Circuit
L

2016

812 F.3d 954

2015

810 F.3d 622

2015

Fourth Circuit E

In re Google Inc. Cookie
Placement Consumer
Privacy Litigation
Long v. Insight
Communications of Cent.
Ohio, LLC.
U.S. v. Daniels

2015

630 Fed.Appx.
184
806 F.3d 125

Third Circuit

L

2015

804 F.3d 791

Sixth Circuit

L

2015

803 F.3d 335

D

United States v.
Christensen
U.S. v. Graham
Anzaldua v. Northeast
Ambulance and Fire
Protection Dist.
American Civil Liberties
Union v. Clapper
U.S. v. Davis

2015

801 F.3d 970

Seventh
Circuit
Ninth Circuit

2015
2015

796 F.3d 332
793 F.3d 822

Fourth Circuit L
Eighth Circuit D

2015

785 F.3d 787

2015

758 F.3d 498

Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc.

2015

784 F.3d 154

Second
Circuit
Eleventh
Circuit
Third Circuit

Eleventh
Circuit
Ninth Circuit

L

E
L

D

E
L
D
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Table 4.3 Continued
United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial ECPA Decisions
Case Name

Year

Citation

In re Zynga Privacy
Litigation
Telecommunications
Regulatory Board of
Puerto Rico v. CTIAWireless Ass’n
U.S. v. Thousand

2014

750 F.3d 1098

Appeals
Court
Ninth Circuit

Result

2014

752 F.3d 60

First Circuit

E

2014
2014

Seventh
Circuit
Ninth Circuit

L

Tysman v. Pellicano
Electronic Frontier
Foundation v. U.S. Dept.
of Justice
Joffe v. Google, Inc.
Joffe v. Google, Inc.
In re U.S. Historical Cell
Site Data
Mortensen v. Bresnan
Communications, LLC.
Seitz v. City of Elgin

2014

558 Fed.Appx.
666
555 Fed.Appx.
677
739 F.3d 1

D

2013
2013
2013

746 F.3d 920
729 F.3d 1262
724 F.3d 600

District of
Columbia
Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Fifth Circuit

2013

722 F.3d 1151

Ninth Circuit

D

2013

719 F.3d 654

L

Sams v. Yahoo! Inc.
U.S. v. Barajas
Lane v. Facebook, Inc.
In re U.S. for an Order
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 2703(D)
Kirch v. Embarq
Management Co.
Garcia v. City of Laredo,
Tex.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc.
Schnabel v. Trilegiant
Corp.
Electronic Privacy
Information Center v.
National Sec. Agency

2013
2013
2013
2013

713 F.3d 1175
710 F.3d 1102
709 F.3d 791
707 F.3d 283

Seventh
Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Fourth Circuit

2012

702 F.3d 1245

Tenth Circuit

L

2012

702 F.3d 788

Fifth Circuit

L

2012
2012

696 F.3d 811
967 F.3d 110

D
D

2012

678 F.3d 926

Ninth Circuit
Second
Circuit
District of
Columbia
Circuit

L

D

E
E
L

L
L
D
L

D
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Table 4.3 Continued
United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial ECPA Decisions
Case Name

Year

Citation

Appeals
Court
Eleventh
Circuit
Ninth Circuit

Result

U.S. v. Cray

2012

Jewel v. National Sec.
Agency
In re National Sec. Agency
Telecommunications
Records Litigation
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC
Suzion Energy Ltd. V.
Microsoft Corp.
American Civil Liberties
Union v. U.S. Dept. of
Justice
Bowden v. Kirkland &
Ellis LLP
U.S. v. Clenney
U.S. v. Warshak
U.S. v. Szymuszkiewicz

2011

450 Fed.Appx.
923
673 F.3d 902

2011

671 F.3d 881

Ninth Circuit

L

2011
2011

663 F.3d 1034
671 F .3d 726

Ninth Circuit
Ninth Circuit

D
E

2011

655 F.3d 1

E

2011

432 Fed.Appx
596
631 F.3d 658
631 F.3d 266
622 F.3d 701
622 F.3d 540

District of
Columbia
Circuit
Seventh
Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh
Circuit
Sixth Circuit

620 F.3d 304

Third Circuit

L

Fifth Circuit

D

Seventh
Circuit
Second
Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh
Circuit
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LEGEND:
E = Expands Digital Privacy Rights
L = Limits Digital Privacy Rights
D = Does Not Impact Digital Privacy Rights.
N = 199

In Figure 4.1, the cases are presented graphically according to the level of impact.
As the figure illustrates, nearly 48% of judicial decisions in the United States Courts of
Appeal resulted in a limitation of digital privacy rights. Approximately 16% of cases
actually led to an expansion of digital privacy rights. And finally, about 37% of cases had
little or no impact on individual digital privacy rights.
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Distribution of case results from ECPA Data
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of ECPA Cases by Level of Impact

Judicial decisions within the U.S. Courts of Appeal can vary widely. As Figure 42
illustrates, the twelve Circuit Courts of Appeal arrive at decisions independently. The
graph demonstrates the extent to which each Circuit Court decided to expand or limit
digital privacy rights.
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Figure 4.2 ECPA Cases by Federal Appellate Circuit and Level of Impact
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When examining judicial cases before the Circuit Courts of Appeal, it became clear that
although a case involved the ECPA, the judicial decisions were often made on other legal
grounds that resulted in no impact on digital privacy rights. In the next few figures those
(no impact) cases were ignored. For those cases that did have an impact, Figure 4.3
shows the comparison between cases that limited digital privacy rights versus cases that
expanded such rights.

Comparison of impact for ECPA Cases by Circuit
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Figure 4.3 ECPA Cases by Circuit Court that Expand or Limit Digital Privacy Rights

Considering the cases that had an impact, 63% or 126 of the original 199 relevant
cases showed positive or negative impact. As the pie chart in Figure 4.4 shows, only
24.6% of cases expanded digital privacy rights while 75.4% limited digital privacy rights.
Although we can see some differences, the overall result of limiting privacy rights was
observed. A later study could explore the possible reasons for these differences.
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Comparison between Federal ECPA cases from Appellate
Courts that Expand or Limit Privacy Rights

EXPANDS

LIMITS

Figure 4.4 The Proportion of Cases that Expand or Limit Digital Privacy Rights

There are twelve United States Courts of Appeal. In some cases, these Circuits do
not follow exact parameters for regions of the country. In grouping them by region and
level of impact, a picture can be drawn that helps us to visualize the differences in how
the courts are deciding digital privacy cases. Figure 4.5 depicts cases that expanded or
limited digital privacy rights by region. As the figure shows, 85% of these cases in the
Southern region limited digital privacy rights, while only 15% expanded rights. For
Midwestern Courts of Appeal, 78% of cases limited digital privacy rights while 22%
expanded such rights. Approximately 75% of Eastern Courts of Appeal limited digital
privacy rights while 25% expanded these rights. And for those Courts of Appeal
identified as lying in the Western region, about 70% of cases resulted in limiting digital
privacy rights while 30% expanded such rights.
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Figure 4.5 ECPA Cases by Approximate Region and Percentage of Impact

For purposes of designation into approximate region, the courts were devided in the
following manner;

South = Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.
Midwest = Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.
West = Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
East = First, Second, Third, Fourth, and DC Circuits.

4.4 In the Matter of Probable Cause and the Right to Privacy
The history of privacy rights in America are inextricably tied to the history of
fourth amendment probable cause law. Because privacy is a judicially made philosophy,
found in the penumbras of various amendments to the Constitution, its implementation
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has been tied to the history and development of constitutional law as it relates to the
various amendments. The fourth amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures has been the primary vehicle to test and ascertain the boundaries of how privacy
laws is enforced.
Probable cause has a troubled history. As early as 1949, the Supreme Court of the
United States was grappling with the idea of what it means for probable cause to be
necessary for warrants to issue. Of historical importance, is the idea that probable cause is
considered by the court to be the relevant standard for both parts of the fourth
amendment. The fourth amendment states in the first part that “the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated…” (Retrieved from
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment).
This right to be secure in our persons, houses, papers and effects is a right that
protects against intrusions by government officials into our private lives without some
sort of reasonableness. The court has usee the idea of probable cause to supply that
reasonableness.
The same probable cause and reasonableness is pulled from the second half of the
amendment. The amendment goes on to state that “... And no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Retrieved from
http://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment4.html).
The court has consistently ruled that probable cause is a standard for the entire
amendment and that the security referenced in the first part of the amendment is protected
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by the same probable cause that exists in the second part of the amendment. There are
numerous Law Review articles and legal scholars that have taken exception with that
approach. For purposes of this study, we do not need to analyze those theories. It is
sufficient to understand that although there are criticisms of the instability of probable
cause doctrine, that instability is based upon what the court should have actually ruled,
and the limitations they have imposed.
The real crux of the issue as it relates to privacy rights, is that the fourth
amendment was never when adopted contemplated to address electronic and digital
information, and the Fourth Amendment could not have possibly been drafted in a
manner to protect those important rights. Nevertheless, and amazingly, the concept and
doctrine of probable cause has been consistently unstable over the years. The instability
in Fourth Amendment rulings have resulted in instability in the concept of privacy.
In early Supreme Court cases like the Brennegan case in 1949, the United States
Supreme Court saw the need to make sure that probable cause was a serious standard that
protected citizens from not only unlawful arrests but also from unreasonable seizures.
Two cases in the 1960s solidified that approach. The first case was Aguilar v Texas
decided in 1964 (Aguilar v. Tex., 378 U.S. 108 U.S., 1964). This case implemented what
became known as the two-pronged test. The second case was known as Spinelli v United
States (393 U.S. 410, 89 S. CT. 584, 21 L. ED. 2D 637 (1969), this case solidified and
upheld the idea of a two-pronged test. The two-pronged test is described as follows:
(11) the affidavit for search warrant must set forth underlying circumstances
necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge validity of informants
conclusion and (2) affiant- officers must support their claim that their informant was
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credible or his information reliable.” (Retrieved from
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/aguilar-spinelli-test/).
This two-pronged test was an important part of American jurisprudence for nearly
20 years. It was a clear and rigid test that assured that false information was not used to
obtain warrants. It also assured that magistrates and judges were conscientious in
ascertaining the veracity of the information that was presented to them to support
affidavits for warrants.
By 1983, the U. S. Supreme Court had become far more conservative, under the
leadership of Justice William Rehnquist. Fourth amendment probable cause was
redefined to limit a person’s expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment
(Tomkovicv, 2013). A series of cases severely limited the ability of citizens to prevent
warrantless searches. This new definition also changed what it meant to have probable
cause, and what was necessary to obtain a probable cause warrant from a magistrate or
judge. This is not the first sea-change in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relative to
fourth amendment law. But this particular change has an interesting effect on privacy
rights. In the case of Illinois v Gates (462 U.S. 213, 1983), the United States Supreme
Court implemented a new test. They abandoned the two-pronged test under Aguilar and
Spinelli, and implemented a quote “totality of the circumstances” test that did not have
multiple parts. This new test also implemented two other doctrines that severely limited
the protection of probable cause. One doctrine was the idea of the “four corners doctrine”
(Pendergast, 1993)
This doctrine postulates that magistrates and judges that are hearing testimony in
support of issuance of a warrant, only need to look within the four corners of the affidavit
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to determine whether or not probable cause exists. This essentially meant that inquiries as
to the veracity of the person submitting the affidavit no longer played a role in
determining whether or not probable cause truly existed. In only looking within the four
corners of the document a judge or magistrate may conclude that sufficient information
has been provided for probable cause to exists, and a warrant should issue. Amazingly,
the idea of the totality of circumstances is in many ways oxymoronic. What the court
phrased as a “totality of circumstances” in reality was a severe limit on inquiry about
circumstances. Magistrates and judges were no longer required to independently verify or
inquire about the veracity of the officer presenting the affidavit, and the underlying
veracity of the affiants themselves. It simply was enough that when they looked at the
four corners of the document and read what was presented to them in the affidavit, that if
they could conclude that under the “totality of the circumstances” the court could
conclude that probable cause existed, then a warrant should issue.
This notion of probable cause became embedded in the court’s cases from that
point forward. So much so that it is now considered precedential, and even the purported
liberal wing of the court no longer vigorously attacks this idea. At the time it was
decided, in a 5 to 4 decision, the four more liberal justices of the Supreme Court
strenuously and vigorously objected to this reinterpretation of probable cause law. They
believed that this new test, or lack of a test, would ultimately lead to the breakdown of
Fourth Amendment protections that the Constitution was trying to support for American
citizens. By the year 2013, the idea that probable cause no longer had a two-pronged test,
but was simply a totality of the circumstances test, was well-established jurisprudence. In
that year in Florida v. Harris, a decidedly liberal judge, Justice Elena Kagan wrote a
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unanimous decision that upheld the idea that the totality of the circumstances test was a
common sense standard of probable cause. One only needs to look back at the dissenting
opinions that were filed in the US v Gates case to realize that probable cause had been
irrevocably and demonstrably weakened.
More importantly to this discussion, is the general idea that electronic and digital
privacy rights are not the same as fourth amendment rights protecting physical space.
Electronic and digital privacy rights encompass part and parcel of an enhanced idea of
privacy as it relates to Americans today. Privacy, or the right to be left alone, is one of the
most important rights that allows individuals to function in a modern-day society.
Whether with computers; within our personal space; with tablets and cell phones; or on
social media with the requisite relationships and connections, our privacy rights should
protect almost all of our daily activities. Incursions by police into physical space as
contemplated by the fourth amendment are by necessity limited in scope. Even in high
police presence areas, the vast majority of citizens do not come in contact with the police
or other government actors attempting to invade their space. When you look at the
probable cause laws that developed around automobiles, houses, and other personal
effects, you have to realize immediately that there aren’t enough police, investigators,
and other government officials to compromise everyone’s fourth amendment rights.
On the other hand, if we start looking at electronic and digital rights, the
technology exists presently to wreck-havoc on a persons’ life by violating their privacy.
We now know that as shown by NSA surveillance, and private company security
breaches, that everyday citizens’ rights could all be affected in a major, extensive and
pervasive manner, without the need for the physical presence of police, other government
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actors and/or private sector entities. Just the pure scope of the capability of government
entities, and corporate entities, to infiltrate, compromise, and utilize personal information
is astounding and mind-boggling.
This dissertation makes the case that probable cause has not been, nor ever will
provide sufficient protection to protect Americans rights to digital privacy from
incursions by government. Digital privacy incursions by other entities; including
corporations and individuals, are likewise not protected by existing jurisprudential norms.
Digital privacy deserves a much higher standard of care then ordinary privacy! The
higher standard of Clear and Convincing Evidence, as discussed in the next chapter, will
allow for the adequate protection of these important digital privacy rights.

4.5 The Doctrine of Clear and Convincing
Before clearly articulating the history of the law behind “clear and convincing
evidence,” it is important to briefly look at a partial spectrum of levels of proof
recognized in the American judicial system. While this is not a comprehensive review, it
does take a look at the four most prevalent standards. There are other standards such as
articulable suspicion, or rational basis test, to name a few, that are present in American
jurisprudence. While acknowledging that these other standards exist, we focus on the four
discussed here because they are necessary to understand where in the spectrum of legal
analysis the concept of clear and convincing fits within the panoply of standards.

58

We have already mentioned probable cause. Of the four standards that we are
briefly reviewing, “probable cause” is the most lenient, weakest, standard available. It
simply means, in laymen’s terms that something is more likely than not likely. Another
standard that is tougher, and the standard in use to determine whether or not a plaintiff
wins in a civil case, is the standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance
of the evidence is simply the idea that when all of the evidence is weighted, one side has
shown that the evidence is stronger on their side versus on the other side. Many people
visualize this test as the test most analogous to the scales of justice. Using the scales of
justice analogy, if the evidence on one side outweighs the evidence on the other side, by
ever so slight a margin, then the weightier side wins.
The toughest test that we have, of the four that we are looking at, and actually one
of the toughest tests of all, is the standard used in criminal cases. It is the well-known
standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The standard articulated in a test called “clear
and convincing” falls between a “preponderance of the evidence” and beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is certainly a higher standard than “probable cause” by a long shot.
The history of the “clear and convincing” standard is not nearly as muddled and troubled
as the probable cause standard. This “clear and convincing” standard is used in many
areas of the law, most notably for our purposes in patent invalidity cases and patent
conflicts (Microsoft v Limited partnership, 2011).
This case was decided by a unanimous Supreme Court and thereby leaves no
doubt as to the parameters and meaning of the ruling. “Clear and convincing” is also
described by the court as “clear and cogent.” The court indicated that there was a
presumption of validity to a patent that has already been issued by the Copyright and
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Patent Office, and that this presumption can only be rebutted with the “clear and
convincing” evidence standard, (Microsoft v Limited partnership, 2011). Other cases also
make it clear that the clear and convincing standard is well understood and rationally
interpreted.
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The idea of privacy as a type of intellectual property is a novel concept at the
intersection of two disciplines. This dissertation submitted to Purdue University
Polytechnic Institute is part of the PhD in Technology program and the Technology
Leadership and Innovation Department. As part of that degree process, the College of
Technology (now Polytechnic Institute) in conjunction with the Graduate School, granted
the author permission to complete one of his cognates necessary for his degree, in
Intellectual Property at the McKinney School of Law of Indiana University at IUPUI. All
of the information concerning Intellectual Property was a part of that effort where the
author received an LL.M. degree in Intellectual Property Law.
Because this entire section that discusses intellectual property law is contained within that
thesis, multiple citations are eliminated. Excerpts from the unpublished thesis
“Ascertaining a Coherent Theory for Differences in Criminal versus non-Criminal
Treatment of Copyright Infringers versus Patent Law Infringers” are reproduced here in
Chapter Five, and in other sections of this document, to complete the effort to merge the
two disciplines into one cohesive whole, effectuating the dual nature of one of the
cognates, intellectual property law, synergistically interacting with the subject of
technology leadership and innovation. This joint effort represents the first publication of
that work.
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5.1 Findings
It is important to go back and look at the research questions that were asked and
to look to the research to answer those questions.

1.

What is the current status of digital privacy laws in the United States?

This question is best answered by demonstrating the stagnant nature of digital privacy
laws. Because Congress has failed to enact any comprehensive updates of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, the courts have had to deal with many cases of first
impression without any statutory guidance. With twelve federal circuits and most cases
being heard by three judge panels, a lot of variation in results occurs. Depending on
which circuit you live in, your chances may differ as to which result or outcome you may
receive. The lack of guidance at the United States Courts of Appeal level also manifests
itself in the hundreds of decisions rendered by both the federal lower courts, as well as
state courts in all fifty states. Digital privacy rights, like liberty, should not depend on
what state you live in or by the luck of which judge you may have had assigned to your
case.

2.

How have judicial decisions affected the digital privacy rights of citizens

Since 1986?
There is no question that the ECPA in 1986 was a forward-looking act. The problem
Congress faced in 1986 was that they did not have “tea leaves” or a crystal ball that they
could use to foresee the future. They could not possibly have anticipated the explosion of
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technological growth over the past 30 years. Because Congress has not acted in a
comprehensive fashion since the ECPA, courts were left to “pick up the slack.” With
numerous court decisions coming from the state and federal level, the anomalies are
readily apparent. Some courts have routinely found in favor of the person attempting to
assert their digital privacy rights. Other courts have routinely found a way to limit digital
privacy rights. As the availability and presence of electronic devices have continued to
grow exponentially, areas of the law that were not designed to address the complexities
of a modern digital economy have had to be improvised. This improvisation has resulted
in vastly different results.

3.

Do current laws adequately protect the digital and electronic privacy rights
of citizens?

No. Digital privacy rights are not well protected. This dissertation presents two
paradigm shifts that would forever change the parameters of digital privacy protection.
These new paradigms are:
a. Clear and convincing as the standard needed to justify an incursion or
violation of a person’s digital privacy rights.
b. Digital privacy as intellectual property.
The idea that we have an entire body of law that exists to protect IP rights and even
allows for criminal sanctions in the case of Copyright violations, is quite instructive as to
the premium society places on protecting intangible property rights.
Digital privacy is a type of Intellectual Property(IP) that needs protection to the
same extent as copyrights and patents. Our failure to recognize that digital privacy
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deserves the same level of protection as historically recognized types of intellectual
property shortchanges the importance of digital privacy rights.
This chapter focuses on five related concepts that play a role in how digital
privacy rights are interrelated to intellectual property rights. The basic idea that the
United States of America would protect intellectual property was an idea that originated
in the first constitutional document. This chapter will accomplish a number of things:
One, we will look at the historical basis as found in the Constitution for the protection of
intellectual property; Two, we will look at the historical basis for the protection of
intellectual property prior to the adoption of the Constitution as adopted by other
societies prior to the founding of the United States; Three, we will look at an extremely
early biblical example of what could be described as copyright and by extension privacy
protection. The biblical example is certainly on the creative side. But it does suggest that
the idea protecting images dates way before the historical analysis given by most
scholars; Four, this analysis will trace the historical divide between copyright law and
patent law; Five, a case will be made that digital privacy should be recognized as an
intellectual property right. Recognizing digital privacy as an intellectual property right
would enhance the legal protections and enhance the ability to collect damages for
breaches. This chapter will look extensively at how the differences between Copyright
law and Patent law came about. This analysis is important to the final argument, made
extensively later, that no real difference should exist in how we as a society protect patent
rights, copyright interests, and digital privacy rights. First, we look at the differences
between Copyright and Patent laws. Both of these types of intellectual property, patent
and copyright, emanate from within the exact same clause in the Constitution. At some
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point we will see that they detoured on completely separate paths. The one path we will
call the copyright path. This particular path ended up with dual enforcement mechanisms
for copyright infringers. One method is civil enforcement of copyright violations. The
other method is criminal enforcement of copyright violations. Obviously, when you are
able to harness the power of the state (criminal enforcement) to protect individual
property rights you have accomplished something worth noting. The other path we will
call the patent path. The patent path does not generally have two types of enforcement.
The patent path consists only of private or civil enforcement. After reviewing these
anomalies, the subject of how these concepts may protect or enhance digital privacy
rights will be explored. This subject area has been explored, to some extent, in two cases
without particular success.
This analysis is extremely important to the discussion of privacy rights because
privacy rights are impacted by multiple actors. On the one hand, you have government
intrusion on individual and corporate digital privacy rights. On another hand, you have
corporate and individual intrusions on digital privacy rights. Business speaks the
language of money. Governments speak the language of power. Individuals speak the
language of liberty. That is to say, that if you want to have an impact on a business or
corporation, simply affect their bottom line in such a manner as to cause pain to the
investors. Fines, judgments, and any other type of financial penalty ultimately will
convince businesses to change their ways, or to abandon certain behaviors. This is clearly
the idea behind punitive damages. It sends a signal to the tortfeasor as well as other
potential tortfeasors that the financial costs of engaging in certain types of behavior are
prohibitive.
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The same does not apply for government, particularly the federal government.
Governments by their nature have almost unlimited resources. Whatever resources they
don’t have, they generally can raise by either increasing taxes, or local governments can
raise money by floating bonds. Financial incentives have some impact, but not to the
same extent that they impact businesses. Power is the language of government. Limited
capability to do certain things, and you can expect to see certain results that are reflective
of preventing the limitations. Governments want to go about doing what they want to do
unencumbered. The last major player in effecting privacy rights are individuals.
Individuals deal in the currency of liberty, and money. But to someone who does not
have significant sums of money, no financial disincentive exists to prevent certain types
of behavior. Criminal penalties on the other hand would be very effective. Relative
recently, Congress implemented bills like Dodd-Frank that provides criminal penalties
for corporate directors and officers. The same deterrent effect could impact corporations
and other legal entities by impacting the officers and directors. The discussion regarding
differences in how patent offenders and copyright offenders are treated relative to
criminal and civil penalties is quite informative to the general need to enforce digital
privacy rights with both civil and criminal options.
The question this research poses is simple but important. Why have we not as a
society started to think of digital privacy rights as a type of intellectual property? The
similarities are great. For example, trade secrets are for the exclusive purpose of
protecting information that you do not want others to have. Not unlike digital privacy.
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The two cases where privacy has been asserted as intellectual property reach some
rather bizarre results, clearly demonstrating the need for Congress and society to rethink
the relationship between intellectual property and digital privacy.
In Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC., The plaintiff, Bollea, attempted to use
copyright laws to protect his privacy in a video of him having sex with a woman that was
not his wife. The court refused to allow Mr. Bollea to use what the court described as an
invalid Copyright claim to prevent the distribution of this video. This raises question of
how a valid copyright claim may be able to be used to protect digital privacy claims. The
Bollea case also raises questions concerning the relatively new field related to the “Right
of Publicity.” The right of publicity is another concept worth exploring as it relates to
intellectual property and digital privacy rights, but that discussion is beyond the purview
of this study and may be a ripe area for further study. A second case in the United States
Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result. In the case of Garcia v
Google, the Plaintiff, Ms. Garcia attempted to block the distribution of an inflammatory
anti-Islamic video that included footage of her that was shot for what she was told was a
different video. She had no intention of appearing in an anti-Islamic video, and was
misled to believe that the video she agreed to appear in would not be anti-Islamic. The
court concluded that as a non-owner of the video, she had no proprietary recognizable
interest in the video footage that would allow her to prevent its dissemination.
Once again though, the question remains open as to how an individual or
individuals that actually have a valid digital privacy interest that could either be
characterized similarly as a copyright or patent claim; a trade secret claim or any other
recognized intellectual property right. The core argument of this chapter embodies the
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idea that the same mechanisms used to protect IP rights, could also be used to protect
digital privacy rights invasions. In analyzing the impact that intellectual property has on
privacy rights, it is important to first look at the historical differences between how
copyright and patent violations have been treated differently under American
Jurisprudence. There've been a number of authors over the years who have looked at this
anomaly.
This legal inquiry takes a completely different path. This study does address many
of the historical arguments as to why this distinction between patent law and copyright
law came into existence. Although, in exploring the various areas and theories that have
been promulgated, this paper will conclude that none of the rationales that have been
postulated so far fully explains the different treatment between the two intellectual
property areas. Ultimately, the paper will apply theoretical paradigms not heretofore
applied to the area of intellectual property law. These theories are well known and well
respected theories in the area of criminology and criminal justice. There are also theories
that sociologists have long recognized as playing a major part in the development of
laws, policies, and the rules and regulations that govern our society. In short, one theory
is called by many “conflict theory.” Although there are other names for the theory, it is
generally recognized as “conflict theory” with variations, depending on the scholar and
scope. Conflict theory postulates that laws, rules and regulations reflect the disparate
power relationship between the “haves and the have-nots.” Those in society who actually
have money, influence, and power, make the rules. A colloquial way of saying this is that
“he who has the gold makes the rules.” (Author unknown, citations omitted. Some have
argued that a comic strip in 1964 first used the expression, but that history is contradicted
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by other scholars). We will see there's a lot of truth to this statement. I will argue in this
presentation that conflict theory accounts for more of the practical difference in how
copyrights are handled versus how patents are handled. It would be disingenuous for me
to suggest that this theory is the only theory that accounts for the variation. I do not make
that claim. We live in a society that is complex and complicated.
A well-known adage in the area of criminology is that you cannot account for all
crime with one theory. You can only account for a portion of crime with various theories.
Criminal behavior is so complex that you need a multitude of theories to be able to even
remotely account for criminal behavior. Intellectual property law is no less complicated.
Numerous motives, theories, and rationales account for various types of behavior. If
anyone suggests that they have the magic answer as to why things are the way they are,
they are not being intellectually honest. I do not make that claim either. What I do claim,
is that one of the theories underlying the anomalous and unique difference between
patents and copyrights can be traced to behavior that comports with the theoretical
underpinnings of conflict theory. To the extent that no one has, to my knowledge, and as
far as my research indicates, tied intellectual property law to the theoretical paradigm of
conflict theory, this study breaks new ground.
Additionally, to the extent that theories regarding the power elite are tied to
theories related to intellectual property law, they are unique and groundbreaking.
Notwithstanding this new understanding and theory, I reiterate that you cannot account
for all behavior by the courts, federal legislature, federal executive branch, and all the
parties involved in promulgating intellectual property rules and regulations with one
theory. I do propose though, that without these theories, i.e. conflict theory, and the
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power elite theories, a true understanding of the reasons why there are anomalous
differences between patent law and copyright law, our understanding is incomplete.
These theories help to demonstrate that class conflict differences, money, power, and
political connectedness play a major role in how laws, rules and regulations are adopted
and applied.

5.2 Discussion

5.2.1 Origins of American Intellectual Property Law
The United States Constitution, article 1, section 8 indicates that “the Congress
shall have power to… Promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.” (U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 6.) These 26 words constitute the entire
constitutional foundation for American intellectual property Law. Our founding fathers
clearly intended to protect intellectual property and to provide a mechanism for Congress
to regulate in this area of law. Congress wasted no time in passing legislation and the first
Intellectual Property law was passed on May 31, 1790. (1790 Copyright Act) The act was
a copyright act that dealt with “maps, charts, and books not exceeding one year.” Some of
the relevant portions of the May 1790 Act indicate:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that from and after the passing of this act, the
author and authors of any map, chart, book or books already printed within these
United States, being a citizen or citizens thereof, a resident within the same, his or
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their executors, administrators or assigns, who hath or have purchased were
legally acquired the copyright of any such map, chart, book or books in order to
print, reprinted, published work in the same, shall have the sole right and liberty
of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books,
for the term of fourteen years from the recording entitled thereof in the clerk's
office, as is herein after directed. (1970 Act)
For the next 100 years, copyright enforcement was a civil matter. Not until
Congress passed a new Copyright Act in 1897 did criminal penalties become a part of
copyright law (1897 Copyright Act). That act stated that;
any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical
composition for which copyright has been obtained, without the consent of the
proprietor said dramatic or musical composition, or his heirs or assigns, shall be
liable for damages therefore, such damages in all cases to be assessed at such
sum, not less than one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for every
subsequent performance, as to the court shall appear to be just. If the unlawful
performance and representation be willful and for profit, such person or persons
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be imprisoned for a period
not exceeding one year (1897 Act).

It is quite interesting to note that the criminalization involved public performances
of copyrighted works. It is also important to note that this law differentiates between
“willful and for profit” conduct and other conduct presumably either not willful and/or
not for a profit. (1897 Act) The point of who was covered by this first act that
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criminalized copyright violations, is an important point. Performers were the primary
target. Later on, in 1909 Congress amended the copyright act to include “aiding and
abetting willful and for-profit infringement” (1909 Act.). Many scholars have suggested
that the reason the act was expanded in 1909 was because the performers that were
covered by the 1897 act, were primarily transient performers who move from town to
town. It was next to impossible to sue them because to try to find their permanent home
address, for service of process, was quite difficult. The 1909 act was passed to allow
those who believed their copyrighted music and material was violated, could go after bar
owners, theater managers, and others who were not quite as transient as the performers
themselves (Copyright Act of 1909). The 1909 Act was far more comprehensive than the
1897 act and included coverage for the following:
Section 4. That the works for which copyright may be secured under this act shall
include all the writings of an author.
Section 5. That the application for registration shall specify to which of the
following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
(a) Books, including composite an cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers and other
compilations;
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers;
(c) Lecturers, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery;
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions;
(e) Musical compositions;
(f) Maps;
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art;
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(h) Reproductions of a work of art;
(i) Photographs;
(j) Prints and pictorial illustrations: (Copyright Act of 1909)
The 1909 Act provided that the above subsections were not intended to limit the
applicability of copyright law only to categorize the areas. It extended coverage to
foreigners that were domiciled in the United States at the time first publication of their
work. That 1909 act spelled out copyright registration requirements, and generally
provided for 28 years of protection for the copyrighted work, with the possibility of a 28
year renewal. For purposes of this discussion, the most important provisions of the 1909
act included:
Section 25 (e) which provided:
Whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted the use of the
copyrighted work upon the parts of musical instruments serving to reproduce
mechanically the musical work, then in case of infringement of such copyright by
the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of interchangeable parts, such as disks,
rolls, bands or cylinders for use in mechanical music-producing machines adapted
to reproduce the copyrighted music, no criminal action shall be brought, but in a
civil action an injunction may be granted upon such terms as the court may
impose, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover in lieu of profits and damages
a royalty as provided in section one subsection (e) of this act. Provided also, that
whenever any person, in the absence of a license agreement, intends to use a
copyrighted musical composition upon the parts of instruments serving to
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reproduce mechanically the musical work, relying upon the compulsory license
provision of this act, he shall serve notice of such intention by registered mail,
upon the copyright proprietor at his last address disclosed by the records of the
copyright office, sending to the copyright office a duplicate of such notice; and in
case of his failure to do so, the court may, in its discretion, in addition to sums
hereinabove mentioned, award the complainant further sums, not to exceed three
times the amount provided by section one, subsection (e), by way of damages and
not as a penalty, and also a temporary injunction until the full award is paid.
Section 28. That any person who willfully and for-profit shall infringe any
copyright secured by this act, or who shall knowingly and willfully aid or abet
such infringement, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not exceeding one year or by a fine
of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or both,
in the discretion of the court; (1909 Copyright Act).
These provisions are quite important to review because the beginnings of a
division in applicability of the act becomes apparent. Once again performers themselves
are subject to criminal penalties. Others who willfully and knowingly aid or abet
performers violating these provisions are also subject to criminal penalties. Excluded
from criminal penalties are individuals who violate someone's copyright by mechanical
method. This is an ironic distinction. In 1909 the cost of reproduction equipment was
quite expensive. The phonograph was invented in 1977 by Thomas Edison and
mechanical reproduction of music had started.
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Common ordinary performers and common ordinary citizens would not have
access to reproduction equipment. The act essentially allows for violation of someone's
copyright by mechanical means provided that royalties are paid as provided for in the act.
The gist of this provision is to allow smalltime performers and artists to be charged
criminally for violating the copyright act, but allowing large corporations, businesses and
wealthy individuals that have mechanical recording devices to avoid criminal liability
provided they pay royalties. It is important to note that even if the violation by
mechanical means is willful and knowing, it is specifically precluded from criminal
liability. Thus begins the very first clear demarcation between social economic classes in
copyright law. The same differentiation between social economic classes and how they're
treated weaves its way throughout intellectual property law for the next generations.
Fast forward almost another 100 years to see other major changes affecting the
criminal nature of copyright violations. Acts in 1971, 1974, and 1976 all expanded the
criminal penalties for copyright violations beyond the 1909 act (1909 Act). These acts
continued to raise the penalties for copyright violations and the 1971 act finally included
sound recordings, specifically. First offenses have penalties as much as $10,000 and
second and repeat offenses have penalties as high as $25,000 (1976 Act).
The 1971 Act also recognized that willful infringement for-profit of mechanically
reproduced recording parts should also be subject to criminal liability (1971 Act). The
1971 act provided a number of provisions including the requirement that copyrighted
music and/or publications should indicate they are copyrighted on the first page. The act
further gives a better definition of what it means to be a sound recording (1971 Act).
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Nevertheless, sound recordings that are mechanically produced did not have full
copyright protection. The 1971 Act spells out the purpose of the act as;
“Existing federal copyright law title 17, United States Code, protects the owners
of copyright in musical works from an authorized and uncompensated duplication
but there is no federal protection of sound recordings as such. As a result, socalled “record pirates” if they satisfy the claim of the owner of the musical
copyright can and do engage in widespread unauthorized reproduction of
phonograph records and tapes without violating federal copyright law. It is also
true under existing law that the protection given to owners of copyright in musical
works with respect to recordings of their works is special and limited. The
purpose of section 646 as amended is twofold. First, section one of the bill creates
a limited copyright in sound recordings, as such making unlawful the
unauthorized reproduction and sell of copyrighted sound recordings. (1971 Act).

5.2.2 Applicability of the Legislation
The 1971 Act is quite extensive in the changes that it makes to the law. This was
in large part to the voluminous findings as indicated in the act. The act goes on to
indicate:
The attention of the Committee has been directed to the widespread unauthorized
reproduction of phonograph records and tapes. While it is difficult to establish the
exact volume or dollar value of current piracy activity, it is estimated by reliable
trade sources that the annual volume of such piracy is now in excess of $100
million. It has been estimated that legitimate prerecorded tape sales have an
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annual value of approximately $400 million. The pirating of records and tapes is
not only depriving legitimate manufacturers of substantial income, but of equal
importance is denying performing artists and musicians of royalties and
contributions to pension and welfare funds and Federal and State governments are
losing tax revenues.
If the unauthorized producers pay the statutory mechanical royalty required by the
Copyright Act for the use of copyrighted music there is no federal remedy
currently available to combat the unauthorized reproduction of the recording.
Eight States have enacted statutes intended to suppress record piracy, but in other
jurisdictions the only remedy available to the legitimate producers is to seek relief
in state courts on the theory of unfair competition. A number of suits have been
filed in various states but even when a case is brought to a successful conclusion
the remedies available are limited. In addition, the jurisdiction of States to adopt
legislation specifically aimed at the elimination of record and tape piracy has been
challenged on the theory that the copyright clause of the Federal Constitution has
preempted the field even if Congress has not granted any copyright protection to
sound recordings. While the committee expresses no opinion concerning this legal
question, it is clear that the extension of copyright protection to sound recordings
would resolve many of the problems which have arisen in connection with the
efforts to combat piracy in state courts. (1971 Act)
It is quite clear from the passage above, that Congress recognized a serious
problem with the failure to protect sound recordings. The automatic royalty provisions of
the 1909 act allowed unscrupulous businessmen to sell some recordings by musicians
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even though these musicians were not under contract to them for their particular
recordings. The remedy of only being able to collect the actual royalty fees put the
recording industry and artists at a serious disadvantage. Congress saw this problem and
corrected it. While this correction may have had a benefit to artists, it was primarily
passed at the behest of recording studios. After signing artists and producing records they
had no way to protect themselves from third-party manufacturers that reproduced the
sound recordings paid the royalty fee, which allow them to sell these records to the
public. Powerful recording industry tycoons and executives lobbied Congress for these
changes.
Both the 1974 act and the 1976 act cleared up other issues and the 1976 act raised
fines to $25, 000 for a first offense and up to $50, 000 for repeat offenders (1976 Act).
In 1982 Congress passed the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act
of 1982. This act was intended to stem a growing amount of piracy for songs and
software. This act in relevant part states as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act // 18 USC 2311 // may be cited as
the “Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982. (1982 Act)
The 1982 Act implements even greater changes to the law by expanding the
coverage to software as well as expanding the scope. It broadens the criminal reach.
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Section 2 indicates:
Sec. 2. Section 2318 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows: Section 2318. Trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, and
copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works;
(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this
section, knowingly traffics in a counterfeit label affixed or designed to be affixed
to a phonorecord, or a copy of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, shall
be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both…
(e) Except to the extent they are inconsistent with the provisions of this title, all
provisions of section 509, title 17, United States Code, are applicable to violations
of subsection (a).
Sec. 3. Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2318
the following new section:
Section. 2319. // 18 USC 2319. // Criminal infringement of a copyright
(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of title 17 shall
be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section and such penalties shall
be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law.
(b) Any person who commits an offense under subsection (a) of this section—,
(1) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both, if the offense—,
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(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of at least one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the
copyright in one or more sound recordings (1982 Act).
This act once again raised the possible fines for violation to up to $250.000.00.
The 1982 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments act of 1982 was by far the most
aggressive and repressive copyright act passed by Congress, it goes on to indicate:
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of at least sixty—, five copies infringing the copyright in one
or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works; or
(C) is a second or subsequent offense under either of subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2)
of this section, where a prior offense involved a sound recording, or a motion
picture or other audiovisual work;
(2) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both, if the offense—,
(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of more than one hundred but less than one thousand
phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more sound
recordings; or
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of more than seven but less than sixty–five copies infringing
the copyright in one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works; and
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(3) shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both, in any other case…(1982 Act).

. Amazingly, someone who was guilty of copying as few as seven videotapes
could be fined as much as $25,000 each, and can spend up to one year in jail. This
provision was enforced against a number of college students that simply copied movies
for personal use. Clearly a violation of copyright law, but fines of $25,000? One year in
jail? In this instance, the 1982 act was passed at the behest of the recording industry in
America. They were determined to protect their financial interests. Interestingly enough,
the same industry, recording industry in America battled and lost one of the major cases
that would define the era. In the case of Sony Corporation of America versus Universal
City Studios Incorporated, 464 US 417 (1984), Universal Studios attempted to force Sony
to remove Betamax players from the market. Universal City Studios along with other
recording industry executives and companies claimed that Sony's Betamax recorder was
designed specifically to violate their copyrights and copyright protected music and
videos. Sony countered that the Betamax player had other non-infringing uses and that
simply because it had the capacity to copy videos did not make it illegal. In a landmark
ruling in 1984 the United States Supreme Court agreed with Sony. They reversed the
Court of Appeals that had held that Sony was liable for contributory infringement of
copyrights. The court indicated that there was a significant likelihood that free television
programs and other recordable events could be recorded that would allow consumers to
time shift their watching habits and that this was not a violation of copyright law. The
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Sonly Betamax case is what opened the door for home recording of music, videos and
other media.
New acts in 1992 and 1997 addressed the problem related to the new digital
environment. The 1997 act became known as the NET act, and increased potential fines
to as much as $100,000 with penalties as much as one year in prison. The last act passed
by Congress is known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). This 1998 act
raises the stakes significantly. First-time offenders can be fined as much as $500,000 and
imprisoned for five years or both. For repeat offenders the maximum penalty is $1
million and maximum time in prison up to 10 years, or both (DMCA). The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act was Congress’ attempt to catch up with the new digital
environment. The act also incorporates and implements the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty. This
all-pervasive act, dealt with not only recording industry concerns, but also the burgeoning
computer industry. By the passage of this act, many were aware that we were living in an
entirely new age of computers and computer technology. Notwithstanding this awareness,
Congress never did fully grasp, as probably most people did not, how ubiquitous
computer based technology would become in our everyday lives. The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) was quite broad at the time of its passage. It did not take long for
the problems associated with digital media, and the brave new digital world to outpace
the confines of the act. Notwithstanding the warp speed that new inventions were
permeating society, The DMCA did accomplish some noteworthy goals. One of the most
important provisions of the DMCA are the safe harbor provisions for online service
providers. The safe harbor provision allows online service providers to not be held liable
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for allegedly infringing material provided that they follow certain guidelines. If they
operate within these guidelines, and either promptly remove or block access to allegedly
infringing material in a timely fashion when they've received notification of infringement
claim from a copyright holder, they will avoid liability as a company (DMCA).
Ironically, this provision of the DMCA codifies what ultimately case law begin to
conclude before the law was passed. The Internet turned copyright law on its head. Prior
to Internet law, copyright law placed the onus of compliance with copyright provisions
on the infringer. The law had positive proscriptions indicating that certain behavior was
illegal or improper under copyright law. It was left up to the potential infringer to avoid
such conduct. A number of cases, primarily led by Google’s parent company, Alphabet,
Incorporated, led the fight to allow Internet service providers to provide Internet content
irrespective of potential copyright violations. The notion that someone, or their agent,
holding a copyright have the responsibility to notify Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of
infringing conduct is a new development in copyright law. The DMCA sets the new
paradigm into statutory law. To the extent that the DMCA picks up where the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 left off, we now have some degree of consistency
in how electronic communications are construed. The missing link and remaining
connections relate to how digital privacy should be affected by these changes.

5.2.3

Patent Law History
The first patent act was passed in 1790. This act allowed patents for “any art,

manufacture, engine, machine or device,” (1790 Patent Act). According to one scholar,
the American Patent Act of 1790 was “the first statutory enactment by any country
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obligating any form of examination to determine whether a patent should be granted,”
(Walterscheld, American Patent Law and Admin., 1997). Walterscheld goes on to
indicate that the idea of absolute novelty was a uniquely American idea. England as well
as the Italian City States did not insist on absolute novelty, only newness to the particular
area where the practice was being introduced. The 1790 act required actual novelty,
(Walterscheld, American Patent Law and Admin., 1997) Just a few years later in 1793
the act was amended to include “composition of matter, “as well as to impose a
registration system akin to the British system in lieu of examination, (Walterscheld, and
1793 Act). Patent law statutory history is quite short as compared to copyright law
statutory history. The 1952 statute amended the 1793 act and laid out what would become
the scheme for patent protection since that time. Under the 1952 act, eligibility for a
patent requires four things. Utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and sufficiency of
disclosure, (1952 Act). The vast majority of activity regarding patent law has been within
the court system. One of the major topics of historical disagreement has been what has
been called “the Jeffersonian story of patent law.” According to advocates of this school
of thought, patent law grants a special monopoly privilege to a few not justifiable under
concepts of natural philosophy. The idea behind this notion is that Congress passed the
Sherman act making monopolies illegal, yet somehow or another people with a patent are
able to have a monopoly. This concept had been buttressed by statements from Supreme
Court justices in their opinions which seemed to support this notion. Other scholars tend
to disagree with that theoretical paradigm and postulate that patents are nothing more
than property rights, (Mossoff, Cornell Law Rev., 2007)
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The America Invents Act (Leahy-Smith Act) presented wholesale changes to the
US Patent system by changing from a first to invent to a first to file system in harmony
with the rest of the world, (Leahy-Smith Act, 2011).

5.2.4

Alternative Theories Pertaining to the Origins of Intellectual Property Law

There are a number of theoretical articles about the origins of intellectual property
law. One author discusses these origins as “Origin Myth” or “Origin Stories.” (Silbey,
Geo. Mason L. Rev.,2008). The author discusses such myths as what he calls the
“creation myth” and indicates that our notions of property rights in the Intellectual
Property area are deeply rooted in those theories from childhood. Other scholars trace our
patent system to the Statute of Monopolies passed in England in 1623. This statute
codified what had been the practice for quite some time in England, namely the practice
of granting to merchants what are called limited term monopoly rights for either new
inventions or importers of new trade, (Walterscheid, Pat. And Trademark Office, 1997).
Walterscheid indicates that the custom of granting limited term monopoly privileges
actually dates back to the Italian City states of the fourteenth and fifteenth century.
Although I cannot specifically address the earliest adoption of patent type protections, it
is my theory that there is an even earlier example of copyright protection than some of
the earliest theories I have seen proposed. This origin is contained in Exodus 20:4 which
reads, “Thou shall not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that
is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.”
(Exodus 20:4 KJV) While many scholars would indicate that this is only a prohibition
against idolatry, a closer analysis would indicate that while it is clearly a prohibition
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against idolatry, there is also the prohibition of a “graven image.” This prohibition of
creating a “graven image” would arguably be the first “Copyright Act.” This prohibition
against graven images is clearly due in part to the claim made in Genesis 20:11 that “For
in six days the lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the
seventh day:” In short, this “copyright” prohibition says “I made it all, it’s mine, and you
shall not copy it by any graven image or likeness thereof.” Most biblical scholars would
indicate that the book of Exodus, also known by the Jewish nation as the part of the
Torah and by later Christians as part of the Pentateuch, was written by the biblical
character Moses sometime around the 5th Century B.C. Although the date is certainly in
dispute, the general timeframe of the authorship of the book is pretty well agreed upon.
Whenever the book of Exodus was written, it appears to be before any other works
claiming to espouse copyright or any other intellectual property right.
Parenthetically, the right to privacy also has deep roots. As mentioned earlier,
Harvard Law Review recognized the existence of that right back in 1890. If we go back
to the Declaration of Independence, the document memorializes the idea of “Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” One thing is certain—without privacy there can
be no liberty! Liberty demands that a person has the right to live their life how they
choose without interference. The idea that a government or business or anyone else can
compromise your privacy without consequences is farcical. To many, liberty is a Godgiven right. If it is inalienable, then privacy is equally important to protect and assert the
right to liberty.
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5.2.5

Other Theories of Law

Much has been written about which theoretical paradigm is at play when
discussing Intellectual Property Law. I attempt to avoid the traditional arguments and to
go in a different direction. We can start this analysis by looking at the theories of Donald
Black regarding the nature, purpose and effect of law. Donald Black asserts in his book
“The Behavior of Law” that “law is governmental social control,” (Black, 1976). The
more social control you have in any particular area, the less need for laws to regulate
behavior. Many people are controlled by their personal relationships. Whether these
relationships revolve around church attendance, social networks, or family relationships,
there are some informal controls that help to assure that individuals behave in compliance
with social norms. In the absence of these informal social controls, formal laws and rules
are necessary. Black sees this relationship as inverse. The more social control the less law
needed. Where there is very little social control, more law is needed, (Black, 1976)..
Donald Black further looks at concepts of stratification as helping to explain the
relationship between law and individuals. He defines stratification as inequality of
wealth. He states in his book that law varies directly with stratification. More
stratification, the greater need for law. Less stratification, a lesser need for law, (Black,
1976).
Black further postulates that “people with less wealth have less law.” That is to
say, according to Black, people that can afford lawyers and can afford to influence
politicians have endless points of law on their side. The poor on the other hand, have laws
that are stacked against them. Because they cannot influence the political process the
laws that are passed are antithetical to their best interest” (Black, 1976).
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Donald Black goes on to demonstrate that law is directional. Upward law versus
downward law. Downward law is quite penal in its approach and effect. Donald Black
continues his analysis by looking at culture. Less culture, more law. More culture, less
law. According to Black, this relationship is curvilinear. What this means is that laws less
likely at the extremes where there is little or no cultural diversity. These outliers do not
necessarily have the same issues as the case is in the middle (Black, 1976).
In general terms, if we take what Donald Black says in his book as true, then the
poor are subjected to more laws than the rich, resulting in the loss of liberty and privacy.
The impact of these laws have a far greater detriment to individuals towards the lower
end of social stratification. Individuals with greater wealth would be far more insulated
from laws and the impact these laws would have in their lives. Further, access to the legal
system would be greater for those who have more resources than those that do not.
Another author, G. William Domhoff, has written a number of books dealing with
corporate and class dominance. One of his books “Who Rules America,” looks at how
power and influence have a lasting and major impact on society, (Domhoff, 2010).
The book specifically deals with what Domhoff and other social scientists call
“The Power Elite.” The power elite are made of members of society that by virtue of their
money, influence, connections and friendships, they dominate the functions and
operations of government and industry, (Domhoff, 2010). By virtue of this inordinate
amount of power, this group has an outsized influence on laws, rules and regulations in
American society. The power elite typically attend some of the same Ivy League
institutions and are socially connected. Domhoff and other social scientists refer to the
“policy planning network.” This group of individuals by virtue of their status as the
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power elite also have inordinate control over foundations, think tanks, policy discussion
groups, and the business Roundtable, (Domhoff, 2010). The book “Who Rules America”
is just one book that supports these theories. The idea of the power elite and the idea of
policy planning networks is well-established in social sciences literature. The Domhoff
book is in its seventh edition, and has been available continuously in the United States
and some edition or another for the past 50 plus years.
The ideas that are postulated are not considered to be fringe ideas or out of the
mainstream social science thought. The idea of the power elite is a well-accepted
mainline social science paradigm. Many scholars trace conflict theory back to the
writings of Karl Marx. While it is true that Marx proposed a conflict theory paradigm,
today's scholars that subscribe to conflict theory are a long way from anything that could
remotely be called socialist theory. The immediate question we have to deal with is how
do conflict theories impact intellectual property law? Is there a relationship? Do these
theories help to explain why the law may be the way it is? I intend to demonstrate that
these theories underlie the very basis of why law is passed and how it became law. If we
go back to the first CopyrightAact of 1897 that imposed criminal sanctions, it is clear that
the only individuals that were directly affected by the criminal portions of the act were
typically transient and without financial means. This is certainly not a coincidence. The
law specifically singled out “public performances” as being worthy of special attention.
This era was before the abundance of recorded musical and video media, so the idea of
copyright violations involving electronic duplication of protected works was limited to
those of financial means. The large commercial studios had the capability to duplicate
and distribute protected works. These studios were ultimately dominated by a few large
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companies such as Walt Disney, 20th Century Fox and Warner Brothers. Why single out
public performances? Although the argument can be made that a movie or musical
production would be a public performance, the record does not indicate that this is what
the law had in mind. It is clear from the language of the act, as well as enforcement
mechanisms used for the next few decades that the idea of public performances related to
live performances by actors and musicians. From the very origins of copyright criminal
law, a class of individuals were singled out that generally were not members of the elite
power structure in society.
It is clear from the early literature that the idea of infringing on someone's
intellectual property rights was considered theft. The ECPA also considers taking
someone’s private digital property theft. A look at Black's Law dictionary definition of
theft would indicate that theft is a “felonious taking and removing of another's personal
property with the intent of depriving the true owner of it.” (Black’s). A theoretical
problem immediately arises when concepts of theft are applied to intellectual property
law violations. For example, in the case of a musical composition, how does the public
performance of that composition deprive the true owner of the composition? While there
may be an infringement, there does not appear to be a deprivation. Both parties can
mutually have access to the musical performance and musical score simultaneously. The
infringers use of the musical composition does not deprive the true owners right to also
play and use the composition. This lack of deprivation makes intellectual property theft,
at least in the case of copyright, different from other types of theft where the true owner
is fully deprived of the use of their property. Thus the term infringement. To whatever
extent Congress decided that infringement is the same as theft, the dissimilarities became
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unimportant. Because Congress has the right to proscribe and forbid certain behaviors,
theoretical notions of theft do not necessarily have to deter Congress from acting. It
obviously did not. Notwithstanding the differences between theft of personal property
versus infringement of intellectual property, Congress saw fit, only in the case of
copyright, to criminalize the latter.
The real question that arises from this fact pattern is why did Congress decide to
criminalize public performances versus other violations of intellectual property law?
When looking at the theoretical paradigms that come to play, as mentioned earlier, by
theories regarding the power elite, and theories about the “haves and the have-nots,” it
becomes more clear that the statutes criminalizing intellectual property law copyright
infringement were specifically designed to accomplish the very thing it appears they were
intended to accomplish. Vis-à-vis to impose a harsh criminal penalty on performers and
actors for their public performances. Some scholars attempt to trace this theoretical shift
from civil penalties only to criminal penalties to the fact that intellectual property
continued to grow in value as opposed to real and personal property. This certainly would
be quite true for the latter part of the 20th century. The real question to answer, is
whether that was actually true in 1897. In 1897, as mentioned before, only a few wealthy
individuals had the capability to actually record and disseminate protected intellectual
property works. These wealthy individuals controlled the fledgling film, book publishing,
and music industry. Why would Congress pass an act that largely ignores the potentially
bigger problem of mass infringement, versus the relatively minor problem of public
performance infringement?
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I am not suggesting that Congress needed a crystal ball to foresee into the future
the rapid growth and development of media production companies. Enough evidence
existed in 1897 for Congress to understand the difference between protecting the interests
of large corporate and financial behemoths, versus protecting the interests of generally,
most commonly, smalltime local performers. It is not too much to infer that Congress was
neither naïve nor misinformed as to who the act would apply to primarily. This is further
made clear by the adoption of the 1909 act which broadens the impact of the criminal
sanctions to cover aiding and abetting, (1909 Act). In making the decision to differentiate
which types of copyright violations would be subject to criminal penalty, Congress
showed a clear preference for protecting one type of rights over others. Congress always
has the right to pass whatever laws it deems appropriate, even if these laws
disproportionately affect the poor.

5.2.6

The Absence of Criminal Sanctions for Patent Violations

While the history of criminal sanctions can be traced from its misdemeanor
origins for copyright law to ever increasing fines and longer sentences for copyright
violators, the absence of any corresponding criminal penalty or sanction for patent law
violations is quite stark. When we consider the fact that the first misdemeanor criminal
sanction for copyright violations was passed in 1897, why is it that nearly 120 years later,
no criminal sanctions have been passed regarding patent violations? The idea of criminal
sanctions for patent violations are not completely novel. The European Union considered
such sanctions when they recently updated their intellectual property laws. Ultimately,
they decided not to impose cruel sanctions for patent violations. When looking at the
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impact to society for patent violations versus copyright violations, many argue that
copyright violations have a larger impact. It may be true that more people are involved in
copyright violations. That is not the same as saying that the impact is larger for copyright
violations. Most recently in the news, many should be aware of what have been termed as
the “smart phone patent wars.”
The major lawsuits in these wars have been between Apple Computer
Incorporated and Samsung Electronics Company, Limited. These multimillion dollar
battles involve billions of dollars in profits and fees. Apple has claimed that Samsung has
violated its patents that makes it iPhones unique. On the other hand, Samsung has made
the same claim about its smartphones. In this battle fought on multiple continents, Apple
has won in some courts and Samsung has won in other courts. One thing is certain; there
are billions of dollars at stake in the litigation. It seems obvious on its face that someone
at one or both of these companies must assume some responsibility for the intentional
violation of patent protections. It is inconceivable that corporate executives at Apple or
corporate executives at Samsung are totally unaware of any infringing activities by their
companies. After the millions of dollars spent in litigation, numerous depositions,
interrogatories and discovery requests, can we logically presume that everyone at either
of both companies just innocently, and unknowingly infringed on the others patent
rights? This is next to impossible to fathom. Engineers, technologists, and other
employees have to have some awareness where they got the ideas or technology that
forms the basis for these lawsuits. With this much evidence in existence, how hard would
it be to mount some sort of criminal investigation that held some of the parties criminally
liable for their behavior? Theories that purport to write off the possibility of patent
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criminal liability based on the difficulty of prosecution are misguided. If given the
statutory authority to proceed with criminal prosecutions, there are some industrious
prosecutors that would quickly build solid criminal cases going after some of the worst
and most flagrant offenders.
In the last 10 years or so, the United States has embarked upon a relative
paradigm shift in how corporations are treated. The Supreme Court has on a number of
occasions indicated that corporations are in fact people. They've indicated that
corporations have rights, duties and obligations stemming from their citizenship as
people. In one such case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310
(2010), the Supreme Court held that companies and unions could spend as much as they
like in elections to defeat political candidates. The decision essentially recognized First
Amendment free speech rights for corporations. The Supreme Court as well as lower
courts have begun to impose corporate criminal liability on not only corporations but also
individually on corporate officers. This new theoretical paradigm posits that those who
run corporations must personally be liable for the behavior of those corporations to assure
that these businesses fulfill all of its obligations to stakeholders. Although the idea of
corporate criminal liability is not entirely new, its imposition to officers and directors has
evolved in recent times, (Dodd-Frank, 2002). After a number of corporate scandals, as
well is corporate failures, the United States passed what became known as the DoddFrank Act. This act specifically provides that officers and directors of a corporation are
charged with the responsibility of knowing what is happening in those businesses. Failure
to understand what's going on, when you are in a position of leadership, is not an excuse
for avoiding criminal liability. The Dodd-Frank Act specifically imposes liability on
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these officers and directors who are in a position to know what the business is doing, or
failing to do (Dubber, Nev. Crim. L. Rev., 2013).
Why is their duplicity in liability for corporate officers and directors when it
comes to patent infringement but clear liability when it comes to other kinds of corporate
misconduct? On the one hand, Dodd-Frank imposes civil and criminal liability to these
officers and directors that violate financial, disclosure, and/or ethical rules and
regulations. Patent infringement is like the 800-pound gorilla in the room. The fact that
Apple and Samsung are involved in over 50 lawsuits with each other regarding patent
infringement gives us some sense as to how important these issues are and the real scope
of potential violations. Most analysts would indicate that the potential loss to business for
patent infringement approaches billions of dollars. Although the estimates are all over the
board, they are all in the billions. That being said, it is difficult to justify why a college
student that downloads ten songs without permission is subject to criminal prosecution,
but an executive of a major corporation can supervise the theft of billions of dollars in
protected patent property, and face no criminal sanctions whatsoever. Under the ECPA,
persons that steal satellite TV or cable signals are criminally prosecuted for their
electronic theft/ How could this possibly be fair? Many have tried to argue that the reason
why there are no criminal sanctions in patent law is because it will be difficult to prove
criminal liability. There certainly may be some truth as to the complexity of patent law,
but as demonstrated earlier, that is not an excuse for not having protections and sanctions
in place for obvious violators.
Let us take a look at the patent process to make some reasoned judgments as to
whether or not criminal liability can be imposed for infringers. In a successful patent
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prosecution (the term prosecution is used to refer to obtaining a patent) certain things
must occur. First, the inventor must describe the invention in writing. Second, the
application must" enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains… To make and
use" an invention. Third, a claim has to be clear and concise. Fourth, the inventor must"
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."
(Mendez, Buff. Intel Prop., 2008). If the Patent Office, and courts that review patent
decisions, can engage in this deep level of analysis, why should we be concerned that
other specially trained lawyers and paralegals cannot navigate successfully any potential
pitfalls with successful criminal prosecution?
United States patent law as currently configured prohibits" whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefore, infringes the patent." (35 USC)
Many argue that prosecuting patent infringers would be too difficult. The reasons
given are that the criminal courts are not qualified to deal with these patent issues. This
argument suggests that patent issues are so complex that judges would not be able to
understand what's going on. If that is true then there should not be any civil violations for
patent infringement. Just like civil judges have to learn the particulars of patent law, so
criminal law judges would have to learn new things. Certainly, a successful defense to
patent infringement would be the invalidation of the patent. It is quite clear that
prosecutors would have to use reasonable judgment in which patent infringers they go
after. This level of discretion is not new to prosecutors. Exercising discretion as to whom
they should prosecute is part and parcel of what prosecutors do every day. Why would
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making that assessment in a patent case be any different than the assessment that
prosecutors make in any case? In a case that is a close call, prosecutors would certainly
have the discretion not to bring criminal charges. They have that discretion now. What
about the clear and obvious violations? Once again, I go to the analogy of a college
student that downloads 10 copies of protected music illegally. The student is prosecuted
for and convicted of criminal copyright infringement.
On the same campus, a professor in one of the university discovery parks,
intentionally steals protected patented information and ideas from another company. The
professor understands fully that these inventions are patented. With full intention of
wrongdoing, the professor infringes on the patent and improperly incorporates the
patented invention into a product for his own startup company. The way the law stands
right now, the student goes to prison, while the professor goes home to dinner! How
could that possibly be fair?
Complexity is not in and of itself a sufficient grounds to allow this disparity to
continue to access. Another reason given for why patents should not be part of criminal
law violations is because some say it is not possible for law enforcement officers to
determine whether or not a patent violation has occurred. (United States Code: Title 35 Patents, Part II).
Other reasons given are that patent litigation is expensive, and that a significant
portion of patents are revoked in the course of patent litigation. (United States Code: Title
35 - Patents, Part II). Once again, simply because prosecutors face a difficult job, should
not be an excuse for corporate criminals, and other violators, to violate the law of patents,
and to use another person’s invention intentionally, potentially making millions or
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billions of dollars in the process, without any criminal liability whatsoever. Complicated
trials for criminal behavior have become a part and parcel of the American landscape.
Once again, complicated trials have become commonplace in the era of Dodd-Frank. In
many ways we have to look at another theory for criminal justice and criminology to
really see what's going on. Edward Sutherland postulated way back in the 1960s a new
concept of criminal liability. He coined the term “white-collar crime".
Edward Sutherland used this phrase to refer to criminals that may be educated,
and are almost always financially well-off, and can wreak havoc in society by stealing
from and misusing corporate assets with impunity, (Friedrichs, 2004). It is still a common
occurrence in the United States for someone that might be guilty of stealing a few
hundred dollars’ worth of goods from the local grocery store to be sentenced to more
time in prison then a corporate executive that may have stolen millions of dollars
including retirees’ life savings. There is no question that the imbalance has improved
over the last 20 years. Notwithstanding the improvement, it is still common that whitecollar criminals are treated with kid gloves as compared to the street criminal that
likewise did no physical harm to the victim.
The only real explanation that gets to the very heart of why people with power,
money, prestige, and connections can avoid criminal liability has to do with a conflict
perspective. Although there are different theories as to why these white-collar criminals
are able to steal millions of dollars’ worth of patented material, none of the theories adds
up without looking at the conflict perspective, and power perspectives.
Only when you analyze how laws are passed and the influence of political action
committees as well as lobbyists in the political process can you reach a conclusion that a
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person guilty of knowingly and intentionally stealing millions of dollars does not face
criminal prosecution but an individual guilty of stealing a few dollars can go to prison for
quite some time. Theories that have been postulated so far, including a conflict
perspective, the power elite, and policy planning networks helps to account and explain
this anomaly. The fact that there have been numerous successful prosecutions in other
areas of IP law undercuts any notion that criminal prosecution in the area of patent law
would be too difficult.
Some examples of other areas of IP law where criminal law violations have been
successfully launched include the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. This act imposes
criminal and civil penalties for the theft of trade secrets. The law was originally passed
because of a high level of concern that foreign companies were attacking American
businesses with electronic theft of important information, (Am. Crim. L. Rev.). The act
defines trade secret as information that has “derived independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
through proper means by the public.” (Am. Crim. L. Rev.) The act further imposes the
requirement that the owner has to take reasonable steps to keep the information private.
(Am. Crim. L. Rev.) The Economic Espionage act also requires that the “theft of trade
secrets benefits a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.” (Am. Crim. L. Rev.).
Prior to adoption of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, another act existed that
also deals with trade secrets. The “Trade Secrets Act” (TSA) deals with the unauthorized
disclosure of government information by employees.
The idea that Patent Violations are immune from criminal prosecution is
inconsistent with the entire notion of protection of individual and corporate privacy,
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property and intellectual property rights. The entire movement in the area of rights
protection seeks to find ways to buttress protection of rights. (Am. Crim. L. Rev.).

5.2.7

The Relationship between the Protection of Electronic Communication and
Protection of Digital or Electronic Intellectual Property Rights

Today, courts disagree on what the constitutional protections may be relative to
electronic communications and surveillance as well as how to protect electronic
intellectual property rights or digital privacy rights. United States Circuit Courts have
split on whether their decisions should expand digital privacy rights or limit digital
privacy rights. Both of these scenarios pose a question implicating how fourth
amendment protections will be analyzed and implemented. What is clear to even a casual
observer is that if digital privacy rights are at risk in general, than digital privacy rights
coupled with valuable intellectual property rights are also at risk. In order to ascertain the
efficacy of legal protections today, it is necessary to compare the protections in existence
today with protections in the past.
This analysis will gauge the status of protection afforded electronic
communications today with the protection levels of electronic and non-electronic
communications in bygone decades. If the protection levels are the same, and courts are
enforcing modern-day electronic communications protections in the same manner that
non-electronic communications were protected in the past, than the case law history from
the past can help to inform us as to what we can expect in the future. If not, then this new
electronic frontier has ushered in a new era that creates a disjunctive from some of the
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common law precedents of the past. If various types of communication common today in
the expanded electronic world do not enjoy the same level of protection that
communications, electronic and non-electronic, had in the past, then we can see that the
law has lagged behind the advancements in communications technology leaving
electronic communication rights, associated data security rights, electronic intellectual
property rights and most notably, digital privacy rights vulnerable and unprotected.

5.3 Conclusion
Many proposals have been made as to how best to protect Americans
constitutional privacy rights. The root of the problem stems from a basic reality. The
founding fathers never really contemplated digital privacy rights per se. They certainly
understood in the fourth amendment that citizens should be “secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects.” Looking at the history of how the United States Supreme
Court found that privacy was a right that emanated from the penumbras of rights as
contained in the Bill of Rights, indicates that we have a judicially mandated concept that
is subject to interpretation and change. A recent look at the make-up of the Supreme
Court demonstrates how this right, particularly of digital privacy, still exists at the whim
of the courts.
Presently there are only eight members sitting on the Supreme Court, after the
death of Justice Antonin Scalia. Most recently, in a case before the court, regarding
funding of public unions, the court split with a four to four tie. It is pretty clear from that
situation that we are at a stage in our history when the Supreme Court could become
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more conservative or more liberal. Who is to say that the earlier rulings, even finding that
there is a right to privacy, are sacrosanct. There is a political battle going on in
Washington DC as I write the final chapter of this dissertation where the Republicancontrolled Senate refuses to act upon the Supreme Court justice nomination of President
Obama. I obviously do not have a crystal ball, and cannot predict how this impasse will
be played out. If the Senate GOP leadership continues to insist that they will not hold any
hearings whatsoever on the presidential nominee, this seat could be made vacant until
after the 2016 elections. If that is the case, the direction of the Supreme Court will be
seriously impacted by whomever wins the 2016 election. If a conservative wins, we can
expect that the court will end up with a conservative nominee and ultimately a
conservative justice. If a liberal wins, we can expect that the court most likely will end up
with a more liberal nominee and ultimately more liberal justice.
Although it is not always clear how conservatives or liberals may view privacy
rights, American’s digital privacy rights should not be contingent upon who is nominated
and confirmed to the Supreme Court. There was no way in the constitutional convention
of the late 1700s that our founding fathers could have foreseen the radical transformation
of our society. Electricity, indoor plumbing, automobiles, airplanes, radio, televisions,
telephones, cellular phones, and a whole host of inventions had not even been dreamed of
by that time. From time to time, the American people have recognized that the
Constitution needed updating to reflect the changes to modern society. It is ironic that the
most recent amendment to the Constitution became effective on May 7, 1992. This
amendment was submitted by Congress to the states for ratification way back in 1789.
The amendment is quite simple and states, “no law, bearing the compensation for the
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services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of
representatives shall have intervened.” (United States Constitution, Amendment 27,
1992).
When this amendment was first submitted to the states for ratification the idea of
privacy rights didn’t even exist. By the time it was ratified in 1992, the need for privacy
rights, particularly digital privacy right was quite apparent.
Today, in 2016, Americans expectations of digital privacy have significant and
important dimensions. Violations of digital privacy rights, as demonstrated in Chapter 4,
not only emanates from the government, but even to a greater extent from big business.
Additionally, individuals, can violate a person’s digital privacy rights, and wreck-havoc
in a victim’s life. Some of the examples, as mentioned, include sportscaster Erin Andrews
and how her life was drastically changed by an invasion of her privacy by a private
individual. In this electronic age, privacy rights, and particularly digital privacy rights are
far more important than simply being secure against unlawful searches and seizures and
the body of law developed to protect physical property.
When the fourth amendment indicates that, “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized,” it was language for a different time and era as it relates to digital
privacy rights. It was brilliant language, no doubt, but antiquated language that was
addressed at physical searches, and not at all aimed at electronic and digital privacy. The
idea of probable cause being necessary before the government can enter your house or
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business, go through your papers and effects, is certainly a valuable protection.
Unfortunately, it is not enough to protect digital privacy rights. Digital privacy rights, are
far more important to our security as a people than the traditional notions of unreasonable
searches and seizures. Probable cause is one of the lowest standards recognized in law.
Although it is certainly greater than articulable suspicion, not by much. As indicated in
earlier chapters, the United States Supreme Court articulated what probable cause means
in the case of Brinegar v. United States (338 U.S. 160). The court implemented the twopronged test in Aguilar v Texas, (378 U.S. 108) in 1964 and abandoned that test in 1983
in favor of a “totality of Circumstances” test in the case of Illinois v Gates (462 U.S.
213). This new totality of circumstances test rejected the stronger two-pronged test. In a
dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshal indicate that the new test allows for
dishonest and unreliable testimony to support a probable cause affidavit that will severely
impact the rights of those that have not committed a crime.
In short, the privacy rights, particularly digital privacy rights, of Americans are
hinged upon whether or not justices that authored the decision in Illinois v Gates, sits on
the Supreme Court, or whether or not justices that are sensitive to digital privacy rights
have control of the Supreme Court. The reality that existed in 1983 still exists today.
Americans’ digital privacy rights can literally be expanded or contracted depending on
the ideological perspective of the five justices who make up the majority of the court.
Digital privacy rights, in 2016, need far more protection than happenstance. Americans
need protections not only from the government but also from private actors. The
judicially created concept of privacy is insufficient to protect these important digital
privacy rights in our complex technological society as articulated today.
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This study proposes three separate solutions to this problem. The first solution:
Judicial Fiat, or adoption of a Clear and Convincing standard for digital privacy rights, by
court rulings. This is a possible but quite unlikely solution. In an era where many justices
have shown a reluctance towards judicial activism it is quite unlikely for the court on its
own to change course that radically midstream. It certainly is possible, but highly
unlikely. The second solution to the problem of digital privacy rights for American
citizens is to seek, and successfully implement a constitutional amendment that
unequivocally protects Americans digital privacy rights. Any such amendment, would
need to abandon, the easily manipulated idea of probable cause.
A more robust standard should exist for violation of an individual’s digital
privacy rights. I propose that a higher judicial standard known as “clear and convincing
evidence,” should apply to this new constitutional amendment. It is important, to limit the
abundance of litigation that would result from a new constitutional amendment to
articulate a standard that is already well known. There is a significant body of law around
the clear and convincing evidence standard. Because this body of law already exists, the
amount of litigation resulting from the new constitutional amendment would be limited.
As indicated in an earlier chapter, as recently as 2011 the United States Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the concept of clear and convincing evidence. The case was a patent
law case. In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership. The court held that in all patent
infringement cases, and accused infringer must prove that the patent is invalid by clear
and convincing evidence. This is an interesting ruling because it essentially says that a
business that owns a patent has a substantial court protected constitutionally protected
right to that property, and that anyone who wants to invalidate that protected right, must
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do so with clear and convincing evidence. Why should the digital privacy rights of
everyday citizens, businesses, and other entities, be afforded any less protection? A
digital privacy amendment will assure that the rights of everyday citizens to be protected
in their electronic security, should be at least as great as a corporation’s right to be
protected from patent infringers.
A proposed digital privacy amendment would read as follows:
The right to digital privacy shall be vigorously protected. Anyone or any entity
that collects personal data must protect the data from misuse. Personal data shall not be
sold or disseminated without permission of the individual or entity affected. Governments
(federal or state) may not access personal electronic data, without a warrant issued by a
competent court. For a court to issue a warrant allowing access to electronic data, the
party seeking the warrant shall demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the
party whose information is sought has committed or is committing a crime. In
circumstances where a government entity (state or federal) seeks to compel a service
provider to disclose a user’s private communications or documents, in any form, a
warrant shall be obtained based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Any government
entity (state or federal) that seeks to track the location of any mobile communication
device or obtain transactional data, by means of any communications technology, shall
first obtain a warrant issued upon “clear and convincing evidence” of the commission of
a crime by the individual whose information is sought. Individuals, business entities and
other organizations are also prohibited from violating digital privacy rights of any
individual or entity. Violations of the provisions of this amendment shall result in severe
penalties as established by Congress. It shall also be a felony to intentionally violate this
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amendment. Congress may enact other criminal and civil sanctions to effectuate the goals
of this amendment.
This solution would certainly solve much of the problem. Raising the standard to
“Clear and Convincing” evidence would establish a very high bar to government
encroachment of digital privacy rights. Assuring that businesses and individuals face
certain punishment by the loss of finances or the loss of liberty would serve as a strong
deterrent to violation of digital privacy rights. The problem with the solution of course is
the extreme difficulty in which it takes to amend the Constitution. As mentioned earlier
the 27th amendment took 203 years to be ratified by the states. The equal rights
amendment, as simple and straightforward as it was, has never been ratified although it
came close. However much time it takes to pass such an amendment would be worth the
effort.
Another solution to the problem of digital privacy rights in America, is the most
practical solution. Congress could, with the president’s approval, simply pass statutory
language almost identical to the digital privacy amendment language above. Obviously, a
statutory scheme should include a much more robust indication of penalties for violations
and potential fines. A statutory scheme would be more comprehensive. But the salient
feature, would be the adoption of a “clear and convincing” standard for the issuance of
warrants, and/or the access of private data. Many would argue that such a standard would
hamper law enforcement. This is doubtful in that law enforcement has always shown a
resilient capability to find and prosecute criminals. Although the United States makes up
approximately 4% of the world’s population, we incarcerate 25% of the world’s
prisoners. The argument that says that law enforcement would be hampered has no
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support in the evidentiary record. More importantly, fragile digital privacy rights of
American citizens would be adequately protected.
One of the things anyone you meet at any prison or jail will tell you, is that the
loss of privacy is a horrendous loss. When incarcerated, you do not have the ability to
keep others from watching you, tracking you, and even searching you. The space that you
live in is open and subject to inspection and unlimited searches and seizures.
Without privacy there can be no liberty, liberty and privacy are intricately tied
together. Digital privacy is the most important type of privacy because conceivable much
more is at stake. Digital privacy also encompasses the ability to be left alone. Without the
ability to be left alone, a major aspect of liberty is compromised. We all need the ability
to engage in our own affairs without the involvement of others. Whether this occurs
inside the home, the workplace, our automobiles, or any other place we may be, it is an
important right to simply not be bothered. Without digital privacy this right cannot exist.
Digital privacy must be protected for liberty to thrive.
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